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THE DESTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY OF FEDERAL PROXY 
ACCESS 
Jill E. Fisch* 
ABSTRACT 
After almost seventy years of debate, on August 25, 2010, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a federal proxy access rule. The 
D.C. Circuit promptly invalidated the new rule before it ever went into effect. 
This Article examines the ill-fated rule and concludes that, although the D.C. 
Circuit did not identify its flaws, the rule was ambiguous in its application and 
unlikely to increase shareholder input into the composition of corporate 
boards. More troubling was the SEC’s ambiguous justification for its rule, 
which was neither grounded in state law nor premised on a normative vision of 
the appropriate role of shareholder nominations in corporate governance. 
Although the federal proxy access rule in its current form is now dead, had 
it gone into effect, its practical significance would have been minimal. The 
SEC’s ambiguous approach to proxy access, an approach that significantly 
predates its adoption of Rule 14a-11, is particularly problematic because its 
rules continue to burden issuer-specific innovations in nominating procedures. 
The SEC has acknowledged this criticism but has refused to remove existing 
regulatory burdens. 
The core of the problem, as illustrated by the SEC’s experience with proxy 
access, is that federal regulation is poorly suited for regulating corporate 
governance. Private ordering offers a more flexible mechanism for 
maintaining equilibrium in the allocation of power between shareholders and 
managers. Absent federal regulatory interference, existing state law permits 
issuer-specific innovation regarding the shareholder role in nominating 
director candidates. This Article concludes by outlining the federal regulatory 
changes necessary to enable effective private ordering. 
 
 * Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I presented earlier drafts of 
this Article to New York University’s Topics in U.S. and Global Business Regulation seminar, the Brooklyn 
Law School Faculty Workshop, and the Center in Law, Economics, and Organization Workshop at the 
University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and received many helpful suggestions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under U.S. corporate law, the shareholders elect the board of directors.1 In 
most cases, however, those shareholders do not nominate director candidates. 
Instead, the nominating committee of the board chooses a slate of candidates, 
and those candidates are submitted to the shareholders for approval.2 Absent 
the infrequent phenomenon of an election contest,3 shareholders do not 
participate in the nomination process.4 
 
 1 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) (“[A]n annual meeting of stockholders shall be held 
for the election of directors . . . .”). 
 2 See Order Approving NYSE and NASD Proposed Rule Changes and Amendments Relating to 
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,177 (Nov. 4, 2003) 
(approving a New York Stock Exchange rule change requiring listed issuers to have an independent 
nominating committee). 
 3 See Lee Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 104, 120–21 (summarizing several reports on the frequency of contested elections and finding 
that, over the time period from 1996 to 2008, the number of contested elections at public companies averaged 
around thirty-six per year). 
 4 Election contests, in which a challenger files a separate proxy card and conducts an independent 
solicitation, generally involve a substantial shareholder that is either seeking control of the company or 
seeking, through board representation, to effect a change in corporate strategy. See CHRIS CERNICH ET AL., 
IRRC INST., EFFECTIVENESS OF HYBRID BOARDS 7–11 (2009), available at http://www.irrcinstitute.org/pdf/ 
IRRC_05_09_EffectiveHybridBoards.pdf (describing how hedge funds use partial board representation to 
attempt to change corporate strategy). Few election contests are premised on differences in directors’ 
personalities as opposed to the policies they propose to implement. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & 
Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (distinguishing between election contests premised on 
policy disagreements and those based on personal issues). 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has struggled for years to 
regulate the shareholders’ role in nominating directors.5 As early as 1942, the 
SEC proposed a rule that would have required issuers to include shareholder-
nominated candidates in their proxy statements.6 Ultimately, the SEC 
abandoned the proposal. In the ensuing almost-seventy years, the SEC 
revisited the issue at least five times but failed to adopt a rule allowing proxy 
access.7 
Adoption of a shareholder nomination rule faced several obstacles. First, 
from the outset, the rule faced strong opposition from business interests. 
Indeed, measured by the number of comment letters, proxy access is, by far, 
the SEC’s most controversial rule-making initiative.8 Second, as the SEC 
refined the federal proxy rules in response to ongoing marketplace 
developments, the details of a proxy access rule became both increasingly 
important and impossible to perfect. Fundamentally, the SEC was unable to 
draft a proxy access rule that would satisfy everyone. Third, the D.C. Circuit 
 
 5 State corporation law, rather than federal securities regulation, is the source of any shareholder power 
to nominate director candidates. Since the 1930s, however, the federal proxy rules have regulated the 
procedures and disclosures associated with shareholder voting and the solicitation of proxies. See Jill E. Fisch, 
From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1130–31 (1993). 
Although the federal rules ostensibly do not modify shareholders’ substantive voting rights, as a practical 
matter, federal regulation has substantially limited the exercise of those rights. Id. at 1134 (“[T]he SEC has 
affirmatively impeded the effectiveness of the shareholder voting process . . . .”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking 
the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path 
Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1087 (2008) (“[T]he use by stockholders of their state law rights had been 
stymied by the SEC itself . . . .”). 
 6 Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No. 
3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
 7 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, 96TH CONG., STAFF REP. ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 29–32 
(Comm. Print 1980) (describing task-force and public hearings on proxy access in the late 1970s); Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 18, 2009) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274) [hereinafter Proposing Release] (proposing a proxy access rule); 
Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 56,160, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,913, 72 
Fed. Reg. 43,466, 43,472 (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposing a rule that 
would allow 5% shareholders to propose proxy access bylaw amendments); Security Holder Director 
Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 
60,784 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249, 274) (proposing a proxy access 
rule); Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,288 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 240, 249) (considering a universal ballot as part of proposed amendments to the bona fide nominee rule). 
 8 See Broc Romanek, Doing the Math: How Many Proxy Access Comment Letters This Decade?, 
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET BLOG (Feb. 12, 2010, 7:50 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/ 
2010/02/math-of-comment-letters.html (stating that the SEC had received almost 52,000 comment letters on 
proxy access as of February 2010). It should be noted that many of these were duplicate or form letters. Id. 
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declared in its 1990 decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC that the SEC 
lacked the authority to regulate corporate governance through the proxy rules.9 
A shareholder nomination rule was likely to raise a potential conflict with this 
holding and to trigger litigation seeking to invalidate the rule.10 
When Congress authorized the SEC to adopt a federal proxy access rule as 
part of the Dodd–Frank financial regulatory reforms,11 it removed the last of 
these hurdles, clearing the way for the SEC both to adopt proxy access and, 
more importantly, to consider explicitly the corporate governance implications 
of increasing shareholder access to the proxy. Yet Rule 14a-11,12 the SEC’s 
proxy access rule, adopted on August 25, 2010, when the ink on Dodd–Frank 
was barely dry,13 was limited in scope and ambiguous in both its application 
and its justification. Indeed, once Congress authorized the SEC’s adoption of 
proxy access, the SEC’s most significant change to its prior proposals was to 
tighten the qualification requirements, sharply limiting the number of 
shareholders that would be able to use the rule. 
Although the SEC described the proxy access rule as “facilitat[ing] the 
rights of shareholders to nominate directors to a company’s board,”14 it failed 
to do so. The restrictive limitations on which shareholders qualify to use the 
rule, coupled with new and existing burdens on shareholder collective action, 
suggested that the rule would be a nonstarter, ineffective in enabling 
shareholders even to exercise their nominating power, much less to affect 
board composition or increase director accountability. In addition, the SEC 
battened down the hatches with respect to state law and private ordering efforts 
 
 9 See 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 10 See Letter from Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 4–
6 (Dec. 22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (arguing that the 
1990 Business Roundtable decision limited the SEC’s power to regulating disclosures, not corporate 
governance). 
 11 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2010)). 
 12 Rule 14a-11 was reserved from the 2010 Code of Federal Regulations pending litigation over its 
validity in the D.C. Circuit. After the rule was invalidated in Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011), the 2011 Code of Federal Regulations omitted the rule entirely. The rule as it was adopted can be 
found at Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9136, Exchange Act 
Release No. 62,764, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,384, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,677–93 (Sept. 16, 
2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249) [hereinafter Adopting Release]. The remainder of 
this Article will refer to the final rule as released in the Federal Register. 
 13 President Obama signed the Dodd–Frank Act into law on July 21, 2010. Overhaul Forces Loan 
Wording Change, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2011, at 8. 
 14 Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts New Measures to Facilitate Director Nominations by Shareholders 
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-155.htm. 
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to facilitate shareholder nominating power. Although it purported to leave 
issuers the option of further extending shareholder nominating rights, the new 
rule burdened the use of issuer-specific alternatives to it—even though recent 
amendments to the Delaware statute explicitly authorized issuers to establish 
shareholder nominating procedures.15 
When the D.C. Circuit invalidated Rule 14a-11,16 it removed a largely 
ineffective tool for shareholder nomination of directors but not the preexisting 
and continuing burdens on private ordering. Existing SEC rules continue to 
impose extensive regulatory requirements on the exercise of shareholder 
nomination rights and to frustrate shareholder efforts to enhance those rights 
through state law mechanisms. 
Regardless of whether one supports shareholder nomination of directors, 
the Rule 14a-11 experience raises a puzzle. If the SEC intended to facilitate 
shareholder nomination of directors, why did it adopt a rule that largely 
insulates issuers from shareholder input into the selection of director 
candidates? If, instead, the SEC determined that increasing shareholder 
nominating power was a bad idea, why go through the pretense of adopting a 
proxy access rule at all? More broadly, the SEC’s rule-making releases offer 
no insight into the SEC’s normative position as to whether proxy access will 
improve the corporate governance of public companies. Absent such 
justification, the exercise of rule-making authority appeared disturbingly 
arbitrary. Yet the D.C. Circuit appeared untroubled by these deficiencies and, 
instead, took the unprecedented approach of second-guessing the conclusions 
of the SEC’s economic analysis. 
This Article explores the destructive ambiguity of federal proxy access. It 
demonstrates the tension between the federal requirements for the exercise of 
shareholder nominating rights and the state law principles upon which the SEC 
purported to ground those rights. It unpacks the ambiguities in the SEC’s 
conception of which shareholders should nominate director candidates. And it 
reveals the ambiguity resulting from the SEC’s failure to confront, in adopting 
its rule, the appropriate allocation of power between shareholders and 
management, and the effects of proxy access on that balance. Ironically, these 
deficiencies highlight the advantages provided by state law regulation of 
corporate governance and strengthen the case for implementing shareholder 
nominating procedures through private ordering. 
 
 15 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing issuers to adopt proxy access bylaws). 
 16 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d at 1146. 
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Because it is important to consider Rule 14a-11 in its historical context, 
Part I of this Article briefly recounts the history of federal proxy access. In Part 
II, the Article describes the major features of Rule 14a-11, the SEC’s 
accompanying changes to Rule 14a-8, and the subsequent history of the rules, 
including the D.C. Circuit’s decision. Part III identifies the SEC’s ambiguous 
rationale for adopting a federal proxy access rule. In Part IV, the Article 
situates proxy access within the broader context of corporate governance and 
demonstrates how latent ambiguity in the appropriate allocation of power 
within the corporate structure and the inability of a mandatory federal rule to 
adjust as necessary to maintain a stable equilibrium render a federal standard 
inferior to state law and private ordering.17 Part V proposes an alternative 
regulatory approach designed to facilitate such private ordering. 
The existing political climate makes it unlikely that the SEC will propose a 
revised proxy access rule, at least in the short term, and the revisions to the 
Delaware statute and Rule 14a-8 provide, at least nominally, the opportunity 
for shareholders to experiment with proxy access through private ordering. As 
described in this Article, however, federal law continues to impede such 
experimentation. With the invalidation of Rule 14a-11, adoption of the reforms 
advocated in Part V of this Article to remove such impediments becomes 
increasingly important. 
I. THE HISTORY OF FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS 
The tepid support offered by the SEC for proxy access and the limited 
scope of Rule 14a-11 are particularly surprising in light of the rule’s long 
gestation period. The SEC has been considering proxy access for almost 
seventy years. Indeed, the SEC first considered a rule that would have required 
issuers to include shareholder-nominated director candidates on the proxy 
statement in 1942.18 This consideration was part of the rule-making process 
that resulted in the adoption of the shareholder proposal rule, now Rule 14a-
8—rule making that resulted from the changes to the proxy solicitation process 
 
 17 This Article uses the term private ordering to describe issuer-specific corporate governance 
provisions, as distinguished from corporate law rules established by statute or regulation. Such governance 
provisions are contractual in nature and typically take the form of a charter or bylaw provision, although they 
may alternatively be embodied in a traditional contract. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., 898 A.2d 344, 345–
46 (Del. Ch. 2006) (describing an agreement between a board and a corporation’s shareholders regarding the 
board’s power to adopt a poison pill); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 (2011) (discussing various uses of the term private ordering). 
 18 See Jill E. Fisch, The Transamerica Case, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 46, 63 (Jonathan 
R. Macey ed., 2008) (describing the 1942 rule proposal). 
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that reduced in-person attendance at shareholder meetings.19 Although the SEC 
adopted a requirement that issuers include shareholder proposals in the proxy 
statement, the SEC abandoned the provision addressing shareholder 
nominations in the face of substantial opposition by corporate management.20 
Subsequently, the SEC revised the shareholder proposal rule to preclude 
proposals relating to director elections. As time went on, the SEC’s 
interpretations of this exclusion became increasingly restrictive, leading the 
SEC to authorize the exclusion of proposals that nominated or advocated the 
election of a particular director, as well as proposals that addressed director 
qualifications or election procedures more generally.21 
Investors repeatedly challenged the SEC’s restrictive approach to 
shareholder voting and urged the SEC to reverse its position. In 1977, the SEC 
established a task force to undertake a comprehensive review of the federal 
proxy rules.22 As part of the review process, the SEC held a series of public 
hearings in which it received testimony and submissions from a wide variety of 
constituents concerning the nomination process.23 Critics of shareholder 
nominations, primarily corporate management, testified that the use of 
nominating committees would adequately address any perceived problems 
about the director nomination process.24 At the conclusion of the process, the 
SEC did not propose a shareholder nomination rule.25 Instead, as the SEC task 
force reported to the Senate, due to the emergence of nominating committees, a 
shareholder nomination rule was unnecessary.26 
In response to continued investor complaints, the SEC undertook another 
“comprehensive review” of the proxy rules in 1990.27 Following two years of 
study, the SEC adopted a variety of controversial rule changes designed to 
 
 19 Securities Act Release No. 2887, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, Holding Company Act Release No. 
3988, Investment Company Act Release No. 417, 1942 WL 34864 (Dec. 18, 1942). 
 20 Fisch, supra note 5, at 1163. 
 21 Fisch, supra note 18, at 63–64. 
 22 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, STAFF REPORT: REVIEW OF THE PROXY PROCESS REGARDING THE 
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF DIRECTORS 3 n.10 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
proxyreport.pdf (describing the SEC’s consideration of proxy access in 1977). 
 23 See DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 7, at 29–30. 
 24 Id. at 122–27. 
 25 In response to the task force report, the SEC developed three proposals, two of which would have 
substantially reduced the SEC’s role in regulating shareholder access to the ballot. Fisch, supra note 5, at 1165 
n.169. The SEC did not adopt these proposals. Id. 
 26 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 7, at 122–27. 
 27 See Fisch, supra note 5, at 1165–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing concerns leading up 
to the SEC’s 1990 review of the proxy rules). 
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reduce the “chilling effect” and costs associated with shareholder participation 
in the proxy solicitation process.28 Despite proposals for a universal ballot that 
would have facilitated investor choice among competing slates of candidates, 
the SEC did not adopt such a proposal, nor did it adopt a shareholder 
nomination rule.29 
Finally, in the wake of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 200230 and the wave of 
corporate governance scandals that precipitated its adoption,31 the SEC 
returned to the subject of proxy access. In May 2003, the SEC solicited public 
comment on its review of the proxy rules relating to the nomination and 
election of directors.32 Several months later, the SEC proposed a proxy access 
rule.33 
The proposed rule, in general terms, would have allowed shareholders that 
had held at least 5% of the company’s stock for at least two years34 to 
nominate from one to three director candidates, but only upon the occurrence 
of a triggering event.35 Triggering events included one or more directors 
receiving a 35% withhold vote, submission of a direct access proposal by 
holders of at least 1% of the issuer’s stock and approval of the proposal by a 
majority of votes cast, and, possibly, the issuer’s failure to adopt a shareholder 
resolution or proposal that had received majority approval.36 
 
 28 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 19,031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,279 (Oct. 22, 1992) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
 29 See id. at 48,287–89. 
 30 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 31 Jill E. Fisch, The Overstated Promise of Corporate Governance, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 923, 924–25 
(2010) (describing frauds at Enron and WorldCom as the most prominent examples of these scandals). 
 32 Notice of Solicitation of Public Views Regarding Possible Changes to the Proxy Rules, Exchange Act 
No. 47,778, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,530 (May 7, 2003). 
 33 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,784–85 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 
240, 249, 274). The rule was explicitly subject to state corporate law provisions concerning shareholder 
nomination rights. Id. at 60,808. In particular, the SEC noted that, to the extent that state law permitted a 
corporation to prohibit shareholder nominations through provisions in its charter or bylaws, the proposed 
proxy access procedure would not be available to shareholders of corporations choosing to do so. Id. 
 34 Id. at 60,806. Where multiple shareholders were eligible to use the rule, the company would only be 
required to include the nominee(s) of the shareholder with the largest stake in the company. Id. at 60,798. 
 35 Id. at 60,789, 60,797. The proposed rule also included various disclosure and independence 
requirements, including a requirement that the nominee be independent of the nominating shareholder. Id. at 
60,795–96. The independence requirement provided, inter alia, that a natural person could not nominate 
himself and that an entity could not nominate a current or former employee. Id. at 60,796. 
 36 See id. at 60,789–91 (describing triggering events). 
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As proposed, the extent to which Rule 14a-11 would have resulted in the 
inclusion of shareholder-nominated directors was unclear. With respect to the 
triggering conditions, the SEC found, in a study of director elections over the 
preceding two years, that roughly 1.1% of companies had total withhold votes 
in excess of 35% of the votes cast.37 The SEC also observed that 84% of 
companies listed on an exchange or NASDAQ had a least one shareholder that 
would have been eligible to submit a proxy access resolution.38 According to 
the SEC, in the event proxy access was triggered, 42% of filers had at least one 
shareholder that, individually, met the necessary ownership requirements to 
nominate a director candidate, and 18% had two or more such shareholders.39 
The SEC did not provide information about the characteristics of these 
shareholders that might provide a basis for assessing whether they would be 
likely to nominate a director. Based on this data, the SEC estimated that the 
proxy access rule would be triggered annually in seventy-three companies and 
that, in forty-five of these companies, at least one shareholder would make a 
nomination.40 
Although the SEC’s estimates may have been overly generous and, even 
under those estimates, shareholder nominations under the proposed rule were 
unlikely to occur frequently,41 business interests mounted substantial 
opposition to the proposal. A total of 504 individuals and entities submitted 
comments on the proposal,42 and an additional 185 comments were 
 
 37 Id. at 60,790. 
 38 See id. (observing that 84% of these companies had at least one shareholder that owned at least 1% of 
the outstanding shares for at least one year). 
 39 Id. at 60,794. 
 40 Id. at 60,810. These estimates were made as part of the SEC’s analysis under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act. Id. at 60,807. The SEC conceded that “there is no reliable way to predict how many more security holder 
proposals would be submitted based on the proposed amendments, how often the events would be triggered or 
how many security holders would be able to meet the applicable requirements (e.g., minimum ownership 
threshold).” Id. at 60,811. 
 41 In 2002, the SEC indicated that there were approximately 9400 reporting issuers. See Acceleration of 
Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Web Site Access to Reports, Securities Act Release 
No. 8128, Exchange Act Release No. 46,464, 67 Fed. Reg. 58,480, 58,489 n.95 (Sept. 16, 2002) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 240, 249). By 2006, that number had increased to almost 12,000. See 
Smaller Reporting Company Regulatory Relief and Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 8876, Exchange 
Act Release No. 56,994, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 2451, 73 Fed. Reg. 934, 935 (Jan. 4, 2008) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260, 269). 
 42 Summary of Comments: In Response to the Commission’s Proposed Rules Relating to Security Holder 
Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 5, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/ 
s71903summary.htm [hereinafter Summary of Comments]. 
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subsequently submitted in response to an additional solicitation of comments.43 
As the SEC explained in its summary, most of those supporting the proposal 
favored a stronger rule—one providing greater proxy access rights.44 
Corporations, corporate executives, and corporate directors, however, “were 
nearly unanimous in their opposition to the proposed rules.”45 Faced with this 
business opposition, coupled with claims that any consideration of shareholder 
nomination should be deferred pending an assessment of the impact of 
Sarbanes–Oxley, Chairman Donaldson abandoned the proposal.46 
The SEC’s decision not to mandate proxy access in 2003 might have laid 
the issue to rest, but institutional investors were not satisfied. Having failed to 
persuade the SEC to adopt proxy access, they sought, through private ordering, 
to implement proxy access procedures at individual issuers.47 In 2006, the 
Second Circuit upheld an effort by the American Federation of State, County 
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), a union pension fund, to submit a 
proxy access bylaw for a vote by AIG shareholders.48 The decision, by holding 
that Rule 14a-8 permitted the submission of proxy access bylaws,49 opened the 
door for investors to establish issuer-specific procedures for shareholder 
participation in the nominating process.50 
The SEC promptly closed the door on these private ordering efforts. 
Expressing concern that the decision would lead to “uncertainty and 
confusion” in the upcoming proxy season and that proxy access bylaw 
amendments could result in contested director elections that did not comport 
with the disclosure requirements applicable to election contests, the SEC 
 
 43 DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC, FILE NO. S7-19-03, SUPPLEMENTAL SUMMARY OF COMMENTS RECEIVED ON 
OR AFTER FEBRUARY 6, 2004: IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO SECURITY 
HOLDER DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS 3–8 (2004). 
 44 Id. at 9–10 (“[M]ore than half the Supporting Commenters desired a stronger rule.”). 
 45 Summary of Comments, supra note 42. 
 46 Gretchen Morgenson, All’s Not Lost, Disgruntled Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at B1 
(explaining that corporate lobbying “helped to defeat” the 2003 proxy access proposal). 
 47 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 66 (describing issuer efforts to obtain proxy access through bylaw 
amendment proposals in the wake of the failed 2003 proposal). 
 48 AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 49 Id. 
 50 The court noted that the SEC was free, however, to change the scope of the election exclusion. See id. 
at 130 n.9 (“[I]f the SEC determines that the interpretation of the election exclusion embodied in its 1976 
Statement would result in a decrease in necessary disclosures or any other undesirable outcome, it can 
certainly change its interpretation of the election exclusion, provided that it explains its reasons for doing so.”). 
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reopened the issue of proxy access.51 The SEC proposed two alternatives. The 
first alternative would have authorized large shareholders that satisfied certain 
conditions to propose proxy access procedures through bylaw amendments.52 
The second alternative proposed codifying the position that the SEC had 
advocated in AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., authorizing issuers to exclude shareholder 
nomination bylaw proposals.53 On December 6, 2007, the SEC adopted the 
latter alternative, overturning the court’s decision in AFSCME.54 
The 2007 amendment, which precluded shareholders from establishing 
nominating procedures on an issuer-specific basis through private ordering, 
was the most restrictive approach to shareholder nomination that the SEC had 
ever taken. President Obama’s election and his subsequent appointment of 
Mary Schapiro to serve as the new Chair of the SEC made proxy access appear 
more likely. In her confirmation hearings, Schapiro pledged to give large 
shareholders more say in the selection of corporate directors.55 
Subsequently, on June 10, 2009, the SEC introduced another proxy access 
proposal.56 The proposal contained two components. First, the SEC proposed a 
revised version of Rule 14a-11 that would have authorized shareholders that 
owned from 1% to 5% of the issuer’s stock (depending on the size of the 
issuer) for at least a year to nominate candidates for up to 25% of the board of 
directors.57 Although the proposal required shareholder candidates to meet 
applicable standards of independence,58 it eliminated the requirement of a 
triggering event59 and the limitations on relationships between the candidate 
 
 51 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,161, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 27,914, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,488, 43,491 (proposed July 27, 2007) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 52 Id. at 43,470 (proposing a rule allowing shareholders that held at least 5% of the company’s stock for 
at least a year and who had filed a 13G in addition to making a variety of further disclosures to propose a 
proxy access bylaw amendment). The proposed rule did not seek to dictate any specific procedures or 
qualifications for proxy access. 
 53 Id. at 43,493. 
 54 Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release No. 56,914, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,075, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 55 Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Pick Pledges to Ratchet Up Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2009, at D1. 
 56 Proposing Release, supra note 7. 
 57 Id. at 29,032–44. The rule proposed to allow shareholders to nominate one director candidate or 25% 
of the board’s directors, whichever was greater. Id. at 29,043. Where multiple qualifying shareholders sought 
to nominate director candidates, the company would only be required to include those candidates from the first 
nominating shareholder or group. Id. at 29,044. 
 58 Id. at 29,040–42. 
 59 Id. at 29,032 (“Today’s proposal does not require a triggering event.”). 
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and the nominating shareholder that had been part of the 2003 proposed rule.60 
The rule also required new disclosures on proposed Schedule 14N—
disclosures that the SEC described as “substantially similar” to those proposed 
in 2003.61 
Second, the SEC proposed amending Rule 14a-8 to permit shareholder 
proposals concerning nomination procedures or disclosures as long as the 
proposals did not conflict with proposed Rule 14a-11.62 The amendment would 
have treated such proposals similarly to all other shareholder proposals—
proposing shareholders would have been required to hold a minimum of $2000 
worth of stock for at least a year63 and would not have been required to make 
any mandated disclosures or filings.64 The SEC explained that this proposal, 
which essentially reversed its 2007 rule change, was feasible in light of the fact 
that any issuer-specific shareholder nomination process would now be subject 
to mandated disclosure under new Rule 14a-19, which included the 
requirement that a nominating shareholder file a Schedule 14N.65 
The SEC received 537 comments in the initial sixty-day comment period.66 
Some of these comments provided data and analysis suggesting that the SEC’s 
review had been incomplete. As a result, in December 2009, the SEC reopened 
the comment period for an additional thirty days, specifically inviting the 
public to comment on this additional material.67 Approximately sixty 
comments were submitted during this additional period.68 
 
 60 Id. at 29,041. 
 61 Id. at 29,045–46. The SEC described Schedule 14N as requiring “disclosure similar to what would be 
obtained in an election contest.” Id. at 29,046. 
 62 Id. at 29,056. 
 63 Id. at 29,056 n.256. 
 64 Id. at 29,056. 
 65 See id. at 29,056–58. 
 66 J.G. Ballard, Regulatory Watch: SEC Extends Comment Period for Proposed Director Nomination 
Rule, BUS. L. CURRENTS (Dec. 15, 2009), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/2009/12/20091215_ 
0022.aspx?cid=&src=E100629001&sp=. 
 67 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9086, Exchange Act 
Release No. 61,161, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,069, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,144, 67,145 (proposed 
Dec. 14, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 274) (referencing four documents 
containing such data and analysis and included in the public comment file). 
 68 Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009.shtml (last modified Nov. 1, 2010) (listing and 
providing links to submitted comments and including approximately sixty comments submitted after 
December 2009). 
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As indicated above, commentators have repeatedly questioned the authority 
of the SEC to mandate proxy access.69 With the adoption of the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act70 on July 15, 2010,71 
Congress addressed these concerns. The new legislation explicitly authorized 
the SEC to adopt rules requiring proxy access, although Dodd–Frank did not 
require the SEC to adopt a proxy access rule.72 President Obama signed the 
legislation on July 21, 2010.73 Just a month later, on August 25, 2010, the SEC 
voted 3–2 to adopt a proxy access rule.74 
II. THE FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS RULE 
The SEC’s final rules contained the same two components as the 2009 
proposal: new Rule 14a-11 (the proxy access rule) and an amendment to Rule 
14a-8 permitting shareholder proposals relating to nomination procedures.75 
Both rules were similar to the 2009 proposals, but Rule 14a-11 reflected two 
significant changes. First, Rule 14a-11 limited proxy access to shareholders 
that have owned at least 3% of the issuer’s stock, providing a uniform 
minimum ownership requirement for all companies rather than varying the 
threshold depending on company size.76 For the largest companies, this change 
was a substantial increase from the 1% threshold originally proposed. Second, 
the final rule increased the required holding period before a shareholder could 
qualify to nominate a director candidate from one to three years.77 Nominating 
shareholders were required to continue to hold the stock through the annual 
 
 69 See, e.g., DIV. OF CORP. FIN., supra note 22, at 6 (describing these objections). 
 70 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 
U.S.C.). 
 71 See Brady Dennis, Senate Passes Landmark Bill in Triumph for Obama, WASH. POST, July 16, 2010, 
at A1. 
 72 Compare Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971 (authorizing the SEC 
to adopt proxy access rules), with id. § 951 (adopting an explicit requirement of periodic shareholder votes on 
executive compensation). 
 73 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs a Contentious Overhaul of the U.S. Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2010, at B3. 
 74 Adopting Release, supra note 12. 
 75 Id. The description in this Part summarizes the key features of the rule. The adopting release contained 
numerous technical details not discussed here including the basis upon which ownership was calculated, the 
procedures for contesting a shareholder nomination and the time periods applicable to such procedures, and the 
manner in which a disqualified nominating group or nominee was to be replaced. See generally id. at 56,677–
740 (detailing the specific provisions of the adopted changes to Rules 14a-11 and 14a-8). 
 76 Id. at 56,674–75. 
 77 Id. at 56,675. The rule addressed various technical details concerning these ownership requirements. 
Among these, ownership, for the purpose of using Rule 14a-11, was defined to include both voting and 
investment power. Id. 
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meeting and to disclose their intentions with respect to continued ownership 
after the meeting.78 As with the 2009 proposal, shareholders were limited to 
nominating a maximum of one director or candidates for 25% of the board, 
whichever was greater.79 
The final rule included new disclosure requirements for nominating 
shareholders and their nominees. Under the rule, a nominating shareholder or 
group had to file a Schedule 14N between 120 and 150 days prior to the first 
anniversary of the mailing of the proxy statement for the issuer’s prior annual 
meeting.80 Rule 14a-18 (adopted at the same time) extended the requirement of 
filing a Schedule 14N to shareholder nominations made pursuant to state and 
foreign law, as well.81 Schedule 14N provides notice to the issuer and the SEC 
of the shareholder’s intent to nominate one or more director candidates and 
requires, inter alia, information about the nominating shareholder’s securities 
ownership; disclosures about the nominating shareholder and the nominees as 
well as any relationships between the nominating shareholder, the nominees, 
and the issuer; and disclosures about the nominees’ qualifications, including a 
statement that the nominees meet the objective stock exchange independence 
criteria.82 
Presumably recognizing that few shareholders would be able to satisfy the 
minimum ownership and holding period requirements individually, the 
adopting release contemplated—indeed, embraced—the formation of 
nominating groups.83 The federal securities laws have traditionally treated 
collective shareholder action with suspicion. Indeed, the adopting release 
specifically warned that communications among shareholders for the purpose 
of forming a nominating group constitute proxy solicitations that are 
themselves subject to Regulation 14A.84 Nonetheless, to facilitate the 
formation of nominating groups, the SEC adopted new Rule 14a-2(b)(7). Rule 
14a-2(b)(7) provided a limited exemption from certain of the proxy rules for 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. This uniform notice period would have preempted an issuer’s advance notice bylaws. For a 
discussion of advance notice bylaws, see JANA Master Fund Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 343–
44 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 81 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,748–49. 
 82 See id. at 56,789–92. 
 83 See id. at 56,674 (“Shareholders will be able to aggregate their shares to meet the [ownership] 
threshold.”). 
 84 Id. at 56,725. 
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oral and limited written communications in connection with the formation of a 
nominating group.85 
The exemption applied only to shareholders seeking to form a nominating 
group pursuant to Rule 14a-11; it did not apply to communications that would 
have had the purpose or effect of changing control of the company, and it did 
not protect shareholders seeking to exercise nominating rights pursuant to state 
law or issuer-specific nominating procedures.86 The rule limited the content of 
written solicitations to specified information, required that all written 
solicitations be filed with the SEC, and required disclosure of oral 
communications prior to the occurrence of the first such solicitation.87 
Other aspects of the proxy rules impeded collective shareholder action.88 In 
response to concerns about these impediments, the SEC amended Rule 13d-
1(b)(1) to provide that participation in a nominating group did not, by itself, 
require a shareholder to file a Schedule 13D, rather than a Schedule 13G.89 
This amendment was of particular significance for activist shareholders that 
might have been concerned, after CSX Corp. v. Children’s Investment Fund 
Management (UK) LLP, about the implications of engaging in collective 
action.90 Group formation could, however, trigger the obligation to file a 
Schedule 13G, and the rule did not provide an exemption.91 In addition, the 
adopting release explicitly stated that nominating groups were not exempt from 
the provisions of section 16 of the Exchange Act, effectively precluding the 
formation of groups with aggregated holdings that exceed 10%.92 
 
 85 Id. at 56,726. 
 86 Id. at 56,726–27. 
 87 Id. at 56,726. 
 88 Fisch, supra note 5, at 1198. 
 89 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,736 (describing the amendment to 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-
1(b)(1)(i) (2011)). 
 90 See 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 
2011) (finding that communications and common objectives of two hedge funds resulted in the formation of a 
group and triggered the disclosure requirements of section 13(d) of the Exchange Act). Qualification to file a 
Schedule 13G, rather than a Schedule 13D, also offers shareholders the opportunity substantially to delay 
disclosure of their intentions. See infra notes 224–27 and accompanying text (describing differences between 
Schedule 13G and 13D disclosure obligations). 
 91 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,735 (“[I]t is possible that in aggregating shares to meet the 
ownership requirement, a nominating shareholder or group will trigger the reporting requirements of 
Regulation 13D–G . . . .”). 
 92 Id. at 56,737 (“[A]n exclusion from Section 16 is not appropriate for groups formed solely for the 
purpose of nominating a director pursuant to Rule 14a-11, soliciting in connection with the election of that 
nominee, or having that nominee elected as director.”). 
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Finally, the adopting release made clear that Rule 14a-11 was not available 
to shareholders that sought to affect the control of the issuer.93 Although the 
SEC attempted to justify this restriction by stating that the rule was not 
intended to serve as a substitute for the existing disclosures and other 
regulation of control contests—despite the expanded disclosure requirements 
of Schedule 14N—the resulting limitations were highly restrictive.94 Each 
nominating shareholder or member of the nominating group was required to 
certify on Schedule 14N that it was not “holding the company’s securities with 
the purpose, or with the effect, of changing control of the company or to gain a 
number of seats on the board of directors that exceeds the maximum number of 
nominees that the company could be required to include under Rule 14a-11.”95 
In addition, no member of a nominating group was permitted to join with 
another shareholder or group in soliciting proxies, to conduct a separate proxy 
solicitation, or to be a participant in another person’s solicitation.96 
The amendment to Rule 14a-8 was similar to that in the 2009 proposal; it 
reversed the SEC’s 2007 rule change and required issuers to include otherwise 
valid shareholder proposals to amend the issuer’s governing documents 
relating to director nominating procedures or disclosures.97 Proposals 
conflicting with Rule 14a-11 or applicable state law were not permitted, nor 
were proposals focused on specific directors or director candidates.98 As with 
the 2009 proposal, shareholders wishing to submit such proposals merely 
needed to satisfy the standard minimum ownership and holding requirements 
of Rule 14a-8.99 As discussed further below, however, shareholders that use 
 
 93 See id. at 56,698. 
 94 Seemingly, however, the SEC did not view these limitations as sufficient. As it explained, the concern 
about control contests also warranted extending the required holding period from one to three years. Id. at 
56,697–98. “[A] longer holding period is another safeguard against shareholders that may attempt to 
inappropriately use Rule 14a-11 as a means to quickly gain control of a company.” Id. at 56,698. 
 95 Id. at 56,675. 
 96 Id. at 56,682. 
 97 Id. at 56,730–32. 
 98 Id. at 56,730. The rule, as amended, permitted the exclusion of any proposal that 
(i) [w]ould disqualify a nominee who is standing for election; 
(ii) [w]ould remove a director from office before his or her term expired; 
(iii) [q]uestions the competence, business judgment, or character of one or more nominees or 
directors; 
(iv) [s]eeks to include a specific individual in the company’s proxy materials for election to the 
board of directors; or 
(v) [o]therwise could affect the outcome of the upcoming election of directors. 
Id. at 56,732. 
 99 Id. at 56,730. 
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issuer-specific nominating procedures must comply with the complete filing 
and disclosure requirements of Regulation 14A in a similar manner to 
shareholders that mount a proxy contest.100 
The new rules applied to all issuers that were subject to the federal proxy 
rules, including investment companies as well as controlled companies in 
which minority shareholders lack sufficient voting power to elect a shareholder 
nominee.101 Many commentators objected to the one-size-fits-all approach and 
urged the SEC to allow private ordering.102 Specifically, commentators argued 
that issuers should have been able to design proxy access procedures that were 
tailored to their individual circumstances.103 
The SEC refused. The final rule explicitly precluded issuers from adopting 
more restrictive approaches to proxy access through charter or bylaw 
provisions.104 The SEC nonetheless purported to ground its approach in state 
law by stating that shareholders could not use the rule if state law (but not a 
specific issuer’s charter) prohibited shareholder nominations.105 
At the time it adopted the rules, the SEC intended them to be effective in 
time for the 2010–2011 proxy season.106 On September 29, 2010, however, the 
Business Roundtable and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce brought suit 
challenging Rule 14a-11.107 The suit alleged that the rule was arbitrary and 
capricious and that the SEC failed to comply with its statutory obligation to 
assess its effect on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.108 The SEC 
voluntarily stayed the effectiveness of Rule 14a-11 and the other amendments, 
 
 100 Id. at 56,733. 
 101 Id. at 56,682–83. The rule exempted companies that were subject to the proxy rules solely because 
they had a class of debt securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act. Id. at 56,683. 
 102 Id. at 56,670–74 (referencing and rejecting commentators’ argument that proxy access rules should be 
determined through private ordering). 
 103 Id. at 56,670–71. For an example of this argument, see Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chair, 
Corporate Leadership Initiative, Bus. Roundtable, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2–3 (Aug. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-267.pdf (“State law . . . provides shareholders 
and boards of directors with the opportunity to deal effectively with the myriad of different circumstances 
applicable to their companies in designing a proxy access and/or proxy reimbursement regime.”). 
 104 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,678–89. 
 105 Id. at 56,674. 
 106 See id. at 56,668 (setting the effective date of the regulations at November 15, 2010). The SEC delayed 
the effective date of the new rules for “smaller reporting companies” as defined in the Code of Federal 
Regulations. Id. (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 107 Petition for Review, Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1305). 
 108 Id. 
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including the amendment to Rule 14a-8, pending the resolution of the 
litigation.109 
On July 22, 2011, the D.C. Circuit vacated Rule 14a-11.110 The D.C. 
Circuit noted that the SEC “has a unique obligation to consider the effect of a 
new rule upon ‘efficiency, competition, and capital formation.’”111 According 
to the court, the SEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing “adequately 
to assess the economic effects of” Rule 14a-11.112 In particular, the court stated 
its belief that “the Commission has not sufficiently supported its conclusion 
that increasing the potential for election of directors nominated by shareholders 
will result in improved board and company performance and shareholder 
value.”113 
Following the announcement of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the SEC 
announced that it would not seek rehearing or appeal the decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.114 By the terms of the stay, it expired once the D.C. Circuit 
issued its mandate.115 On September 20, 2011, the SEC published a brief notice 
indicating that the amendment to Rule 14a-8 and the additional amendments to 
the federal proxy rules, other than Rule 14a-11, would become effective on 
that day.116 
III.  JUSTIFYING FEDERAL PROXY ACCESS 
A. The SEC’s Explanation 
Despite the years of attention that the SEC has devoted to proxy access, it 
offered a surprisingly limited defense of Rule 14a-11 in its proposing and 
adopting releases. The SEC did not defend the rule in terms of possible 
corporate governance objectives, such as increased shareholder voice, better 
 
 109 See Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
 110 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1156. 
 111 Id. at 1148 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 80a-2(c) (2006)). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1151. 
 114 Press Release, SEC, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 
6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm. 
 115 Bus. Roundtable, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act Release No. 63,031, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 29,456, 2010 WL 3862548, at *2 (Oct. 4, 2010). 
 116 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act Release No. 9259, Exchange Act 
Release No. 65,343, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,788, 76 Fed. Reg. 58,100, 58,100 (Sept. 20, 
2011). 
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board composition, or improved corporate performance.117 Instead, the SEC’s 
releases offered two narrow and ambiguous justifications. First, the SEC stated 
that the rule was necessary to ensure that shareholders enjoy the same rights 
that they could exercise through personal attendance at an annual meeting.118 
Second, the SEC suggested that proxy access might increase director 
accountability to shareholders.119 
As the SEC explained, the federal proxy rules were designed to replicate, as 
nearly as possible, an in-person shareholder meeting.120 At an in-person 
meeting, shareholders have the power to nominate as well as elect director 
candidates.121 The SEC acknowledged that, despite this objective, it has 
exercised its rule-making authority to restrict, rather than enhance, shareholder 
voting power. One example of this restrictive approach is the SEC’s refusal to 
adopt a universal ballot or form of proxy that would require issuers to disclose 
all validly nominated director candidates.122 Another example is its approach to 
Rule 14a-8, which has limited shareholders’ ability to establish nomination 
procedures through private ordering.123 Recognizing that the federal proxy 
rules have imposed affirmative impediments on “the exercise of shareholders’ 
 
 117 Ironically, these were nonetheless the criteria against which the D.C. Circuit evaluated the rule. Bus. 
Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150–51. 
 118 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,670. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Although state statutes do not explicitly articulate shareholder nominating power, the claim is that such 
power is implicit in the statutory power to elect directors. See Carolyn Check & Michael Miller, Determining 
Shareholder Access: Examining Shareholder–Management Relationships Through the Differing Lenses Used 
by the SEC and the “Common Law” of Corporate Bylaws, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 297, 300 (2009). In truth, 
existing director elections more closely resemble shareholder ratifications of the board’s choice of directors. 
Alternatively, shareholders might be viewed as “confirming” the issuer’s slate, in much the same way that the 
Senate confirms the President’s appointment of judges and other public officials. Issuers appear, however, to 
assume that shareholders have the power to nominate director candidates. A recent empirical study found, for 
example, that in a sample of large U.S. corporations, virtually all had bylaw provisions that explicitly 
authorized shareholders to nominate director candidates. See id. at 303–04. 
 122 Rule 14a-4(d)(4), the bona fide nominee rule, explicitly precludes the use of a universal ballot by 
requiring nominees to consent to their inclusion on a proxy card. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 5, at 1168–69 
(describing the SEC’s refusal to adopt a universal ballot and its continued efforts to preclude shareholders 
from having an opportunity to choose from among shareholder-nominated and issuer-nominated director 
candidates); Richard J. Grossman & J. Russel Denton, Never Mind Equal Access: Just Let Shareholders “Split 
Their Ticket,” M&A LAW., Jan. 2009, at 28 (describing the inability of shareholders to split their votes when 
voting by proxy absent a universal ballot). 
 123 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC’s response to private ordering 
efforts by AFSCME). 
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rights” to nominate and elect directors to company boards of directors, the SEC 
explained that Rule 14a-11 was designed to remove these impediments.124 
Critically, the SEC did not defend either its historically restrictive approach 
to proxy access or its new regulations in terms of a normative perspective. In 
other words, the SEC did not purport to be identifying an appropriate level of 
shareholder nominating or voting power or to ground its regulations in 
identified deficiencies in existing corporate governance mechanisms. Instead, 
the SEC claimed simply to be implementing shareholder power under state 
law. As the SEC repeated throughout the adopting release, its objective was to 
“facilitate the effective exercise of shareholders’ traditional State law rights to 
nominate and elect directors to company boards of directors.”125 
Second, the SEC drew a relationship between the impediments to the 
exercise of shareholder nominating rights and a lack of director accountability. 
As the SEC explained in the proposing release, the 2008 financial crisis  led 
many commentators “to raise serious concerns about the accountability and 
responsiveness of some companies and boards of directors to the interests of 
shareholders, and has resulted in a loss of investor confidence.”126 The SEC 
suggested that the federal proxy rules “may be impeding the ability of 
shareholders to hold boards accountable,”127 observing that the academic 
literature “points to a link between board accountability and company 
performance.”128 Although it did not specifically find either that boards were 
insufficiently responsive to shareholder needs or that Rule 14a-11 would 
increase board responsiveness, the SEC nonetheless concluded that its rule 
changes would “significantly enhance the confidence of shareholders who link 
the recent financial crisis to a lack of responsiveness of some boards to 
shareholder interests.”129 
The SEC’s effort to defend Rule 14a-11 as facilitating the exercise of state 
law rights was disingenuous. By specifying qualifications and criteria for the 
exercise of nominating power, Rule 14a-11 attempted to create a federal 
nominating power—a power far narrower than that granted to shareholders by 
state law. State law gives all shareholders equal power to nominate directors 
without regard to the quantity of stock they own or the period for which they 
 
 124 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,025–26. 
 125 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,677. 
 126 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,025. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 29,026. 
 129 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,670. 
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have held it. With limited exceptions, state law grants all shareholders 
governance rights proportionate to their economic interest without requiring a 
minimum ownership threshold or holding period.130 State law does not 
condition the exercise of voting power on shareholder-specific characteristics, 
such as independence, lack of control, intent, and the like. Moreover, to the 
extent that shareholder nominating power is based on the power to elect 
directors, state law provides no basis for limiting such nominating power to a 
lesser number of nominees than those upon whom the shareholders vote, much 
less an arbitrary limit of 25% of the board. 
At the same time, state law grants issuers substantial power to determine 
the scope of shareholder nominating rights, power that the SEC eliminates 
through the mandatory nature of the federal nominating power that it creates. 
Although the SEC asserted that shareholder nominating power is implicit in the 
shareholders’ right to elect the board,131 nothing in state corporation law 
requires corporations to give shareholders this power. The SEC’s claim that 
this power is “imposed by statute” and “cannot be bargained away”132 was 
simply incorrect. State law allows corporations to limit or eliminate 
shareholder nominating rights. Indeed, state corporate law does not even 
require that the board of directors be elected by the shareholders—shareholder 
election of directors is merely a default rule that may be modified in the 
corporate charter.133 To the extent that Rule 14a-11 prohibited corporations 
from adopting provisions that provide more limited nominating rights, it was 
flatly inconsistent with existing state law. Similarly, the continued burdens 
imposed by the proxy rules on nominations that do not conform to the 
 
 130 Exceptions to this general principle include tenure voting rights, which increase voting power for long-
term shareholders, see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1370, 1373 n.10 (Del. 1996) (discussing a tenure 
voting plan in which shares held for three years would enjoy ten times the voting power of shares held for a 
lesser period), and some state antitakeover statutes, which may have the effect of disenfranchising large 
shareholders, see CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 73–75, 85 (1987) (upholding a state 
antitakeover statute that removed voting rights of acquired shares unless restored by a vote of minority 
shareholders). 
 131 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,672–73. 
 132 Id. at 56,672. 
 133 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2001) (authorizing corporations to issue one or more classes 
of stock that may have “such voting powers, full or limited, or no voting powers” as set forth in the certificate 
of incorporation). Indeed, prior to the adoption of the federal securities laws, a number of corporations 
restricted or eliminated the voting rights of common shareholders. See W.H. Stevens, Stockholders’ Voting 
Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 357–60 (1926) (describing the use of 
nonvoting common stock by major public corporations in the 1920s). It is worth noting that many state statutes 
require shareholder approval of specified transactions, such as mergers and charter amendments, and that those 
provisions may afford voting rights to otherwise nonvoting stock. See id. at 359 (observing that corporate law 
may have required a shareholder vote to ratify certain actions). 
FISCH GALLEYSFINAL 5/1/2012  7:46 AM 
456 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:435 
requirements of Rule 14a-11 frustrate, rather than facilitate, the exercise of 
state law rights. 
This frustration is most apparent in the context of Delaware corporation 
law.134 Delaware, the state of incorporation for most publicly traded 
companies, recently amended its statute, explicitly authorizing corporations to 
establish bylaws requiring the inclusion of shareholder nominees in the issuer’s 
proxy statement.135 The Delaware amendments authorize shareholders to 
establish shareholder nomination procedures on an issuer-specific basis and to 
adopt (or reject) minimum ownership and holding period requirements 
appropriate to the issuer and its shareholder base.136 Rule 14a-11, however, 
prohibited bylaw provisions that were more restrictive than the federal rule and 
subjected more lenient provisions to the same federal regulatory requirements 
as mounting a proxy contest. In short, Rule 14a-11 eviscerated the enabling 
approach of the Delaware statute. 
That state law does not offer a foundation for federal proxy access is 
illustrated most dramatically by the fact that Rule 14a-11 provided proxy 
access for shareholders of investment companies.137 Most investment 
companies are not even organized as corporations under state law, but as 
business trusts.138 State law does not require business trusts to have 
shareholder-elected directors.139 Rather, the requirement of a shareholder-
elected board stems from the Investment Company Act.140 In responding to 
 
 134 Rule 14a-11 similarly frustrates the exercise of shareholder nomination rights under North Dakota law. 
North Dakota permits 5% shareholders to nominate director candidates without requiring a minimum holding 
period or limiting the number of director nominees. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-08 (2007). In addition, the 
North Dakota statute explicitly limits the disclosures that an issuer may require from a nominating shareholder. 
Id. 
 135 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (Supp. 2011). Delaware’s legislation followed a debate over the validity 
of such bylaws under Delaware law. Although many commentators took the position that such bylaws would 
be valid, the SEC prevented courts from resolving this question for a number of years by allowing issuers to 
exclude shareholder bylaw proposals. See Strine, supra note 5, at 1086–88 (describing the debate and the 
SEC’s basis for exclusion). 
 136 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112. 
 137 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,683–85 (describing the application of Rule 14a-11 to 
investment companies). 
 138 Philip H. Newman, Legal Considerations in Forming a Mutual Fund, in ALI–ABA COURSE OF 
STUDY: INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE 7, 9 (2008) (explaining that most mutual 
funds today are organized as Massachusetts business trusts, Delaware statutory trusts, or Maryland 
corporations). 
 139 See id. 
 140 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 
-64 (Supp. IV 2010)); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
1961, 1967 (2010). 
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commentator suggestions that investment companies be excluded from Rule 
14a-11, however, the SEC stated its belief “that facilitating the exercise of 
traditional State law rights to nominate and elect directors is as much of a 
concern for investment company shareholders as it is for shareholders of non-
investment companies.”141 The adopting release contained no source of 
authority for the claim that the right to nominate and elect directors is a 
“traditional State law right[]” for mutual fund shareholders.142 
The SEC’s conception of shareholder nominating groups similarly lacked a 
basis in state law. State law does not contemplate or require that shareholders 
exercise their nominating or voting power collectively by forming shareholder 
groups. Indeed, it is unclear how state law would respond to a shareholder 
group’s exercise of corporate power—the selection of director candidates who 
will be included in the company’s proxy statement—when that corporate 
power is not available to shareholders generally. Would members of the 
shareholder group, for example, owe fiduciary duties to other shareholders? 
More generally, to what extent did a rule like Rule 14a-11 infringe on existing 
board responsibilities such as determining the qualifications of the 
corporation’s directors?143 
Rule 14a-11 thus attempted to create a federal nominating power that was 
both narrower and broader than shareholders’ traditional state law rights. 
Specifically, Rule 14a-11 reflected the SEC’s ambiguous determination of 
which shareholders are eligible to exercise nominating power and under what 
conditions. In the next section, this Article examines that determination to gain 
a better understanding of the objectives of federal proxy access. Although Rule 
14a-11 has been invalidated, the rule was the culmination of repeated SEC 
efforts to structure proxy access through arbitrary qualification requirements, 
and as such, the following analysis should operate as a constraint on future 
rule-making proposals. 
B. The Terms of Federal Proxy Access 
The SEC’s predictions about the effect of Rule 14a-11 were guarded. As 
indicated above, it defended the rule in terms of “facilitating” shareholder 
 
 141 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,684. 
 142 See id. Although the D.C. Circuit criticized the application of Rule 14a-11 to investment companies, 
its criticism was limited to concerns about the SEC’s cost–benefit analysis. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 
1144, 1156–58 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 143 The relationship of state law to federal proxy access is considered in more detail in Part III.C. 
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nominating power, rather than expressing an intention to increase the number 
of shareholder nominees. Moreover, although the SEC predicted that the rule 
“will result in a greater number of nominees appearing on a proxy card,”144 it 
offered no judgment that the existing level of shareholder nominations was 
insufficient and provided no benchmark by which to assess whether an 
increase would be appropriate.145 Indeed, the SEC made all its substantive 
arguments in support of proxy access without attempting to quantify the extent 
to which shareholders would use it. It was only seventy-four pages into its 
adopting release (as published in the Federal Register), in the context of its 
statutorily required cost–benefit analysis under the Paperwork Reduction Act 
(PRA), that the SEC provided any quantitative analysis.146 
Both the analysis and resulting statistics were underwhelming. The SEC 
estimated that, out of approximately 11,000 reporting companies other than 
investment companies,147 forty-five companies per year would receive a 
shareholder nomination under Rule 14a-11.148 The basis for this estimate was 
“the number of contested elections [fifty-seven] and board-related shareholder 
proposals [118] that have been submitted to companies.”149 Although neither 
contested solicitations nor shareholder proposals bear any relationship to 
director nominations under Rule 14a-11, the SEC stated that these numbers 
indicate shareholders that “have shown an interest in using currently available 
means under our rules to influence governance matters.”150 Significantly, of 
course, shareholders did not need to meet any of the eligibility criteria of Rule 
14a-11 to initiate an election contest or submit a shareholder proposal. The 
SEC also did not explain the methodology by which these numbers translated 
into an estimate of forty-five nominations. 
Even if the statistics regarding election contests and shareholder proposals 
offered a measure of the number of shareholders interested in corporate 
governance, it is unlikely that any of those shareholders would have qualified 
to use federal proxy access. Hedge funds, which were unlikely to be eligible, 
 
 144 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,673. 
 145 See Jonathan R. Macey, Too Many Notes and Not Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor 
Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director Elections and Mozart’s Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759, 768–71 
(2007) (questioning the availability of a baseline by which to determine whether the existing level of contested 
director elections is appropriate). 
 146 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,742. 
 147 Id. at 56,751. 
 148 Id. at 56,744. It further estimated that six investment companies would receive such a nomination. Id. 
 149 Id. at 56,743 & n.408. 
 150 Id. at 56,743. 
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for reasons discussed below, to use Rule 14a-11,151 conducted virtually all of 
the contested solicitations in the Georgeson list upon which the SEC relied.152 
Shareholders submitted the “[b]oard related proposals”153 pursuant to Rule 
14a-8, which requires a shareholder to own just $2000 worth of stock.154 In 
neither case did the number of shareholders that chose to use these 
mechanisms provide the SEC with a basis for estimating the number of 
shareholders that would have been able and willing to use Rule 14a-11.155 
To understand the SEC’s expectations better, it is useful to consider more 
carefully the conditions upon which Rule 14a-11 allowed shareholders to 
nominate director candidates. The minimum required ownership level was 
perhaps the most controversial issue in the debate over the various 
formulations of the SEC’s proposed proxy access rule. As the SEC observed in 
its proposing release, commentators argued in favor of minimum ownership 
levels ranging from the $2000 ownership level required under Rule 14a-8 to a 
requirement that shareholders own 3, 5, 10, or even 15% of the issuer.156 
At the heart of the debate is the question of which shareholders should be 
able to nominate director candidates. The SEC accepted the position that 
shareholders should be required to have a substantial financial interest in the 
issuer to exercise nominating power.157 A minimum ownership requirement 
could be defended as preventing nuisance nominations and unqualified 
 
 151 Any contest in which a dissident filed a proxy statement and distributed a separate proxy card was 
included in Georgeson’s list. GEORGESON, 2009 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 47 n.* (2009), 
available at http://www.georgeson.com/usa/download/acgr/acgr2009.pdf. As a result, the list includes issue-
based contests, such as proposals to remove a classified board, which involve a very different type of 
shareholder engagement than proposing a competing slate of directors. The list also includes at least twelve 
solicitations at investment companies, id. at 47, which raise very different issues than a contest at an operating 
company. Moreover, by definition, a contested election involves a shareholder that is willing to incur the costs 
of a separate solicitation. 
 152 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,743 n.804 (citing GEORGESON, supra note 151). 
 153 Id. 
 154 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2011). 
 155 The SEC considered and rejected, as alternative bases for its estimates, a variety of predictions made in 
connection with its earlier proposals, specifically the 2009 proposed rule. See Adopting Release, supra note 
12, at 56,743. These earlier estimates were largely based on counting the number of shareholders that met the 
qualification criteria and then predicting what percent of eligible shareholders might choose to submit a 
proposal. Specifically, the SEC estimated that 5% of those companies with at least one eligible shareholder 
would receive a 14a-11 nomination. Id. The SEC first recognized that it could not rely on these numbers 
because the 2009 rule had a much lower threshold for eligibility. Id. It then rejected the methodology behind 
this approach, reasoning that the presence of a qualifying shareholder did not provide evidence about that 
shareholder’s interest in nominating directors. Id. 
 156 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,035. 
 157 Id. 
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candidates. Although state law does not impose this requirement, the SEC 
based federal proxy access on its own determination as to which shareholders 
would make the best use of this power. 
Neither the comment letters in support of a minimum ownership 
requirement nor the SEC’s various proposals contained any empirical 
justification for the claim that a minimum ownership requirement will result in 
higher quality nominations. The releases did not show that investors with 
larger shareholdings are more sophisticated, better able to identify qualified 
directors, or more expert in corporate governance. Indeed, at least some 
academic commentary has criticized institutional investors for supporting 
governance reforms that are not correlated with improved corporate 
performance.158 The releases did not demonstrate that investors with larger 
shareholdings spend more money to research and monitor their investments; 
many large investors have limited budgets and do not spend substantial 
resources on governance research. The releases did not show that the interests 
of investors with larger holdings are correlated with those of other 
shareholders.159 Indeed, commentators have demonstrated that large 
institutions may have competing objectives with respect to their portfolio 
companies.160 
Of course, a minimum ownership requirement drastically limits the number 
of shareholders that can use a proxy access rule. First, as a practical matter, any 
required ownership level beyond the most minimal precludes all retail 
investors from nominating director candidates. This preclusion is arguably at 
odds with the fact that, as a group, individual investors are most likely to 
benefit from the cost savings associated with proxy access since their interests 
are insufficiently large to make an independent solicitation cost-justified. 
Because retail investors, as a group, tend to be long-term investors, the 
exclusion is also at odds with the SEC’s articulated objective of placing 
nominating power in the hands of long-term holders.161 
 
 158 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable 
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) (reviewing empirical literature and 
concluding that institutional activism has little or no effect on the performance of targeted firms). 
 159 See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2010) (observing that institutional intermediaries’ objectives with respect to their 
portfolio companies may not be limited to maximizing firm value). 
 160 See, e.g., id. 
 161 See Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,035 (articulating this objective). 
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The SEC did not explain why retail investors are presumptively 
disqualified from identifying appropriate director candidates. Concededly, 
corporate managers have long disparaged activism by individual shareholders. 
Yet activists such as John and Lewis Gilbert, early champions of the 
shareholder proposal rule, advocated a variety of corporate governance reforms 
that have been embraced by today’s institutional investors, including proper 
auditing, the elimination of staggered boards, and limits on executive 
compensation.162 Harvard law professor and retail investor Lucian Bebchuk 
has served as a type of modern corporate gadfly, challenging executive pay 
policies and crafting innovative bylaw proposals to address the scope of a 
board’s power to deploy a poison pill.163 Denver activist Gerald Armstrong’s 
frequent shareholder proposals have included requests to eliminate classified 
boards and to implement advisory shareholder votes on executive 
compensation164—both issues that have been the frequent focus of large 
institutional investors. Armstrong’s proposals at Supervalu, where he has held 
350 shares for approximately a dozen years, received the support of a majority 
of shareholders.165 Indeed, both Bebchuk and Armstrong are likely to be 
among the investors counted in the SEC’s PRA analysis as those interested in 
using existing corporate governance mechanisms, although neither qualified to 
use Rule 14a-11. Retail investors may challenge management viewpoints, but 
the SEC’s releases presented no evidence that, as a class, they are incapable of 
participating meaningfully in the election process. 
Even if a minimum ownership requirement is appropriate, neither the SEC 
nor commentators offered any basis for selecting 3% as an appropriate 
minimum. If the threshold was designed to limit nominations to those with a 
substantial economic interest, one might have expected a threshold tied to the 
overall size of the interest rather than to the proportion of shares that it 
represented.166 If 3% is a proxy for a large dollar value, one would have 
 
 162 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 50 (recounting the Gilbert brothers’ shareholder initiatives). 
 163 See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, The Gadfly in the Ivory Tower, FORTUNE, Apr. 16, 2007, at 40, 40 (describing 
Bebchuk as “America’s most influential critic of CEO pay”). Bebchuk owned 140 shares of Computer 
Associates as of 2006. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 738 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 164 See Matt McKinney, Shareholders OK “Say on Pay,” STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), June 26, 
2009, at D1. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Nor does the release consider relative significance—the size of a given investment relative to a 
particular investor’s overall portfolio or total wealth. Consider, for example, the Florida State Board of 
Administration, the $100 billion state pension fund that was the subject of extensive public criticism for its 
loss of $334 million on its investment in Enron. See Alison Frankel, Class Warfare, AM. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 
76 (describing the Florida State Board and the size of its loss); Mark Hollis, Enron Losses Trigger Scrutiny of 
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expected the release to contain statistics quantifying the typical dollar value of 
a 3% stake and explaining why investments of less than that amount are not 
economically significant. Such an analysis might note, for example, that a 3% 
stake in the toy company Mattel, currently number 392 on the Fortune 500 
list,167 is worth more than $345 million168 and explain why an investment of 
less than $345 million does not give its owner a sufficient incentive to make 
responsible director nominations. 
In fact, existing evidence suggests that shareholders view investments of 
far less than 3% as economically significant and act accordingly. In 2001, the 
Regents of the University of California had purchased more than two million 
shares of Enron stock for the university’s retirement funds.169 The Board of 
Regents was selected by the court to serve as lead plaintiff in the Enron 
securities class action based on the size of the funds’ losses in the company 
stock and a congressional determination, reflected in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995170 (PSLRA), that lead plaintiffs should be those 
whose economic interest in the litigation is substantial.171 That the Regents had 
sufficient incentives to litigate vigorously was reflected by the fact that the 
Enron settlement included the rare requirement that outside directors contribute 
toward the settlement out of their personal assets.172 The funds’ interest, 
however, which at one time was worth close to $200 million,173 represented 
less than 0.3% of the company.174 The Regents would not have come close to 
qualifying to nominate an Enron director under Rule 14a-11. 
 
State Panel, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 24, 2002, at 6B (noting mounting “criticism . . . over 
the Florida pension fund’s losses in Enron stocks and bonds”). Clearly the loss, which represented one-third of 
1% of the fund’s assets, was financially significant. Similar CalPERS’ and CalSTRS’ Enron stock represented 
less than 0.1% of each fund’s total portfolio in June 2001. Kathleen Pender, CalPERS Had Enron Because 
Many Did, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2001, at G1. 
 167 Fortune 500 2011: Top 500 American Companies—Mattel, CNNMONEY (May 23, 2011), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/snapshots/272.html. 
 168 As of March 30, 2012, Mattel had a market cap of $11.51 billion. MAT Industry: Toys & Games, 
YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/in?s=MAT (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). 
 169 In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 454 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
 170 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 171 In re Enron Corp., 206 F.R.D. at 442, 459. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions, and 
Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 61–
62 (2001) (describing the lead plaintiff provision of the PSLRA). 
 172 See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006) (describing the 
terms of the Enron settlement and demonstrating the infrequency with which directors are required to 
contribute personal assets). 
 173 Enron stock peaked at approximately $83/share. The Enron Scandal, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2002, at 
3B. 
 174 At the time of its collapse, Enron had 754.3 million shares outstanding. Id. 
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As the Enron example illustrates, the 3% ownership requirement would 
have had the effect of limiting proxy access to a very small subset of 
institutions. Public pension funds, union pension funds, foundations, and the 
like virtually never hold as much as 3% of a company—holdings of even 1% 
are comparatively rare because such concentrated holdings increase the risk of 
a portfolio. Hedge funds often buy stakes of more than 3% but, as discussed 
below, are unlikely to meet the three-year holding period requirement.175 The 
only institutional investors that regularly hold 3% stakes for at least three years 
are mutual funds, and even then, only a small few funds are likely to achieve 
that ownership level for any given company.176 At the same time, mutual funds 
have historically been among the least active investors in corporate 
governance. Mutual funds do not serve as lead plaintiffs or submit shareholder 
proposals.177 Indeed, until they were forced to do so, mutual funds neither 
voted their shares178 nor filed claims to recover their damages in securities 
fraud litigation.179 
Indeed, the recognition that mutual funds and hedge funds were the most 
likely investors to meet the ownership threshold may provide some explanation 
for the second requirement to nominate directors under Rule 14a-11: a three-
year holding period. The SEC stated that this requirement would limit 
nominating power to shareholders with a long-term perspective, based on the 
premise that a short-term perspective is detrimental to an issuer’s long-term 
performance and that, as a result, the interests of shareholders with a short-
term focus are in conflict with those of other shareholders.180 The empirical 
 
 175 See William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1420 tbl.8 (2007) 
(finding a mean holding period of twenty-one months for hedge fund investments in a sample studied). 
 176 See Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership Re-Concentration in 
the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11, 16–17 (2008) (documenting increased block ownership by mutual 
funds from 1999 to 2005). 
 177 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869, 880 (2005) (“Mutual funds have failed to 
participate in securities fraud litigation at all, despite their substantial holdings.”); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. 
Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate 
Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 319 (2008); Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of 
Shareholder Activism in the United States, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2007, at 55, 63 fig.3 (documenting 
sponsors of corporate governance shareholder proposals). 
 178 See H. Anne Nicholson, Note, Securities Law: Proxies Pull Mutual Funds into the Sunlight: 
Mandatory Disclosure of Proxy Voting Records, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 687, 696–97 (2004) (describing the 
adoption of federal requirements for mutual funds to vote their stock). 
 179 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail 
to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 879 (2002) (reporting that mutual funds 
regularly failed to file claims in successful securities fraud class actions). 
 180 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,697. 
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support for this conclusion is limited. Although corporate America has cited 
the short-termism of institutional investors as a basis for restricting shareholder 
power,181 there is little evidence that shareholders are able to convince 
managers to sacrifice long-term firm value in favor of short-term interests.182 
Indeed, short-term investors, because they trade actively, may be better 
informed.183 A recent study by Yan and Zhang found that trading activity by 
short-term institutional investors forecasts future returns and that the resulting 
performance does not reverse over a longer time period—refuting the 
argument that short-term institutions pressure managers to maximize short-
term earnings at the expense of long-term returns.184 The authors found no 
evidence that long-term institutional investors had superior long-term 
information or were superior monitors.185 
The three-year holding period, however, would likely have eliminated any 
remaining shareholders that could have used Rule 14a-11. Empirical studies of 
hedge fund activism show that, contrary to many claims, activist hedge funds 
are not particularly short-term in focus.186 Nonetheless, their median holding 
period is about twenty months,187 far less than required by Rule 14a-11. The 
average mutual fund turnover ratio has gradually increased to almost 100%, 
meaning that the fund turns over its entire portfolio in a year.188 Of course, the 
ratio is an average—some securities are held for just a few months, some for 
much longer. Nonetheless, actively managed funds are likely to hold relatively 
few securities for more than three years. In addition, those securities held for 
longer are least apt to trigger board nominations because the longer holding 
period likely reflects the portfolio manager’s satisfaction with the company’s 
 
 181 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The 
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203 (1991) (describing “[t]he short-term bias 
imposed by institutional stockholders” and suggesting reforms to remedy the problem). 
 182 See George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010) (explaining that no one has demonstrated that shareholders are myopic and that 
myopic shareholder behavior would conflict with basic principles of market efficiency). 
 183 Xuemin (Sterling) Yan & Zhe Zhang, Institutional Investors and Equity Returns: Are Short-Term 
Institutions Better Informed?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 893, 920–22 (2009). 
 184 See id. 
 185 Id. at 922. 
 186 E.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
FIN. 1729, 1731 (2008). Bratton finds a similar median holding period of twenty-one months. Bratton, supra 
note 175, at 1420 tbl.8. 
 187 Id. at 1732. 
 188 See Katie Rushkewicz Reichart, Is Your Manager Trading Too Much?, MORNINGSTAR (Aug. 18, 2009, 
6:00 AM), http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=304376 (explaining that a firm with a 
turnover ratio of 100% has an average holding period of one year for its portfolio securities). 
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performance. A portfolio manager can more readily address a perceived 
problem by invoking the Wall Street Rule and selling the stock of a disfavored 
issuer than by nominating candidates for the board. 
Even indexed investors that do not actively trade were relatively unlikely to 
meet the holding requirement of Rule 14a-11. First, because they are indexed, 
such investors hold relatively small percentages of each portfolio company. 
Second, fluctuations in the underlying indexes create a significant amount of 
fluctuation in the resulting portfolios. As CalPERS explained to the SEC, just 
two-thirds of the securities in its domestic index portfolio as of June 30, 2010, 
had been in the portfolio three years earlier.189 
The SEC acknowledged the restrictive nature of these requirements. In its 
adopting release, the SEC admitted that two-thirds of publicly traded 
companies did not have even a single shareholder that met the holding and 
ownership requirements of Rule 14a-11.190 This statistic reflects the 
significance of the modifications made to the Rule shortly before its 
adoption.191 The SEC had previously reported that more than 99% of large 
accelerated filers had at least one shareholder that could meet the ownership 
and holding period requirements of the proposed rule, more than 85% of 
accelerated filers had at least one such shareholder, and “roughly 59% of 
[nonaccelerated] filers . . . ha[d] at least one shareholder” that could meet the 
requirement.192 Even under the provisions of the 2003 proposed rule, which 
would have required the occurrence of a triggering condition, a higher 
percentage of issuers—42%—had a shareholder that would have qualified for 
proxy access.193 
 
 189 See Letter from Anne Stausboll, Chief Exec. Officer, CalPERS, et al., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, 
SEC (Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Stausboll Letter], available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-sof/ 
marketinitiatives/initiatives/proposed-proxy-disclosure-rules.pdf (reporting that 1570 of 2322 securities were 
held three years earlier). 
 190 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,692. The SEC “estimate[d]” this data based on data 
collected and reported in its proposing release that related to a one-year holding requirement rather than the 
three-year requirement adopted in the final rule. Id. at 56,690 n.221. Given the significance, in assessing the 
rule’s rationality, in determining the number of shareholders eligible to use it, it is unclear why the SEC 
viewed an estimation process as sufficient. 
 191 Id. at 56,690 n.221. 
 192 Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,036; accord Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,693 (noting 
that other studies reporting investor ownership levels typically did not include the requirement of a continuous 
three-year holding period). 
 193 Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 26,206, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,794 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 
249, 274). 
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The SEC’s claim that Rule 14a-11 facilitated the exercise of shareholders’ 
state law rights was seriously flawed if the majority of issuers lacked even a 
single qualifying shareholder.194 Moreover, qualifying alone was not enough—
for proxy access to have been meaningful, those shareholders that qualified 
must have been willing to use it.195 Thus, the SEC’s release should have 
included an analysis of the extent to which cost considerations, liability 
concerns, and institutional structure might have precluded eligible shareholders 
from seeking to nominate directors under Rule 14a-11,196 an issue to which this 
Article will return. 
The SEC’s attempted solution to these eligibility concerns was the 
nominating group. Rule 14a-11 granted nominating power to a “nominating 
shareholder or nominating shareholder group.”197 Specifically, Rule 14a-11 
provided that the 3% holding requirement could be met by a shareholder group 
that, “in the aggregate, . . . hold[s] at least 3% of the total voting power.”198 
The SEC clearly expected that institutional investors would engage in 
collective action to form groups with holdings of sufficient size to meet the 3% 
threshold. 
That the rule permitted aggregation did not mean that a qualifying group 
would have been easy to assemble. The SEC’s own data indicated that, at 69% 
of issuers, a qualifying group would require the participation of six or more 
shareholders—six or more of the very largest institutional investors.199 By way 
of concrete example, CalPERS explained to the SEC in its comments on the 
proposed rule that aggregating the holdings of the twenty largest pension funds 
on the share register of Goldman Sachs would result in a holding of only 
 
 194 Somewhat anomalously, for purposes of its cost–benefit analysis, the SEC projected that eleven issuers 
would receive nominations made by a single shareholder. See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,744 
n.805. Given that two-thirds of public companies lacked even a single shareholder that was eligible to use Rule 
14a-11, it is unclear who would have submitted those nominations. 
 195 In addition, the SEC did not exclude corporate insiders, such as founders, CEOs, and existing 
directors, from its statistics on qualifying shareholders, despite the fact that such insiders do not need Rule 
14a-11 to influence board composition. For example, the shareholders who own more than 3% of Yahoo! 
include founders David Filo and Jerry Yang. See Yahoo! Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 36 (Apr. 
29, 2010). Similarly, Warren Buffet and Bill Gates (through the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) own more 
than 3% of Berkshire Hathaway. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 16–17 (Mar. 
11, 2011). Warren Buffet is the company’s chairman and CEO, and Gates is a director. Id. at 7–8. 
 196 The D.C. Circuit did not view this omission as a deficiency in the SEC’s economic analysis. See Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–56 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 197 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781. 
 198 Id. at 56,755 n.861. 
 199 Id. at 56,692. 
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2.88%.200 Similar data previously released by CalPERS indicated that the ten 
largest public pension funds together hold less than a 2.5% stake at Bank of 
America, Microsoft, IBM, and Exxon Mobil.201 As will be described below, 
federal law imposes various burdens on group formation, but even in the 
absence of those burdens, overcoming the consent and coordination problems 
necessary to assemble a group of this size is not trivial. 
To complicate matters, the SEC was ambiguous with respect to permissible 
group size and the appropriate methodology to be used in aggregating the 
holdings of group members. The SEC did not explain whether each individual 
group member had to satisfy the three-year holding requirement for the total 
number of shares that it contributed to the group’s holdings or whether group 
members could tack their holding periods. Tacking, which is permitted in other 
regulatory contexts, such as the calculation of holding periods under Rule 
144,202 would enable a shareholder that owns 3% for two years and then sells 
to another shareholder that holds for an additional year to meet the holding 
period by forming a group. Similar issues could arise with respect to members 
of a mutual fund family—would the group satisfy the requirements by holding 
a net position of at least 3% for three years, or would each fund’s contribution 
to the total be limited to the number of shares that it held individually for the 
entire three-year period? 
Aggregation highlights a more fundamental ambiguity in the SEC’s stated 
objectives. Rule 14a-11 did not limit the number of shareholders whose 
holdings could be aggregated for the purpose of satisfying the rule. If group 
size is unlimited, dozens or even hundreds of shareholders might join together 
to meet the ownership threshold. Yet the SEC’s stated rationale for the 
threshold was to limit nominating power to those shareholders that possess a 
substantial interest. A large group comprised of smaller holders would likely 
result in a delegation of power either to a shareholder that does not individually 
meet the 3% threshold or to a third-party agent or intermediary. Either 
delegation would be inconsistent with the concerns articulated in the adopting 
release. 
 
 200 Stausboll Letter, supra note 189, at 2. 
 201 Lucian A. Bebchuk, Another View: Don’t Gut Proxy Access, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (June 21, 2010, 
9:00 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/another-view-dont-gut-proxy-access/. 
 202 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(3) (2011) (combining the holding periods of acquirer and acquiree for 
certain transactions, including securities acquired through pledge, gift, or conversion). 
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The early experience with the selection of a lead plaintiff under the PSLRA 
highlights the potential challenges posed by allowing aggregation of 
shareholder interests.203 Plaintiffs, often with the assistance of counsel, created 
lead plaintiff groups in an effort to assemble the largest collective interest in 
the litigation and thereby secure the lead plaintiff appointment.204 In a few 
notable cases, courts were asked to approve the appointment of lead plaintiff 
groups consisting of hundreds or even thousands of shareholders that 
individually lacked substantial financial stakes.205 The formation of these 
groups created agency costs both because the groups were themselves 
unwieldy mechanisms for making litigation decisions and because, in some 
cases, the group was effectively controlled by a third party—in this case, lead 
counsel—whose financial interests differed from those of the group 
members.206 
Ultimately, courts largely rejected extensive aggregation under the PSLRA 
as inconsistent with the statutory objectives.207 Nonetheless, even smaller 
groups pose coordination and collective-action problems. For example, the 
lead plaintiff group in the Cendant case,208 which consisted of three 
institutional investors, could not reach a consensus position with respect to 
challenging the fee awarded by the trial court through an auction procedure.209 
Even if these ambiguities were resolved, formation of nominating groups 
would be hindered by existing federal regulatory burdens on collective 
shareholder action. The adopting release explicitly recognized these 
 
 203 See generally Fisch, supra note 171, at 67 (describing formation of large lead plaintiff groups under 
the PSLRA). 
 204 Id. at 54. 
 205 See, e.g., In re Network Assocs., Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(considering lead plaintiff applications from two competing groups, one consisting of more than 1725 
investors and the other consisting of over one hundred institutions and thousands of individual investors). 
 206 See Fisch, supra note 171, at 71–73 (explaining how large lead plaintiff groups transfer authority to 
counsel, creating agency costs). 
 207 See, e.g., In re Tarragon Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 07 Civ. 07972 (PKC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91418, at 
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2007) (citing In re Donnkenny Inc. Sec. Litig., 171 F.R.D. 156, 157–58 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997)). The courts premised their analyses on the explicit statutory purpose of the lead plaintiff: reducing 
litigation agency costs. See, e.g., In re Donnkenny Inc., 171 F.R.D. at 157–58 (explaining that the appointment 
of a lead plaintiff group was inconsistent with the statutory goal of “prevent[ing] lawyer-driven litigation”). In 
contrast to the PSLRA, the SEC’s release adopting Rule 14a-11 contains no such specification of the rule’s 
objectives, making it impractical for the SEC or a court to find that a particular example of aggregation 
frustrates those objectives. 
 208 In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D.N.J. 2000), aff’d, 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 209 See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 717 n.363 (2002) (describing the disagreement among the Cendant group members). 
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burdens,210 but the rule changes did not offer adequate relief. In the absence of 
such relief, the potential for formation of nominating groups is substantially 
reduced. Regulation 14A, for example, requires shareholders that engage in 
proxy solicitations to file those communications, as well as a proxy statement, 
with the SEC.211 The adopting release explicitly stated that shareholder 
communications in connection with the formation of a nominating group 
would be treated as proxy solicitations.212 
The SEC offered two limited concessions to the need for shareholder 
collective action under Rule 14a-11. First, the SEC adopted a narrow 
exemption, in Rule 14a-2(b)(7), for solicitations in connection with the 
formation of a nominating group.213 To qualify for the exemption, written 
communications were limited to four items: a statement of the shareholder’s 
intent to form a nominating group, a description of the proposed nominees or 
the characteristics of intended nominees, the percentage of voting power held 
by the soliciting shareholder, and the means by which shareholders can contact 
the soliciting party.214 Compliance with these limitations did not exempt the 
communications from a filing requirement—written communications had to be 
filed with the SEC as of the date they were first used,215 precluding 
shareholders from testing the waters or exploring whether they wanted to 
proceed with a 14a-11 nomination before publicly disclosing their intentions. 
The exemption did not limit the content of oral solicitations, but soliciting 
shareholders were required to file a Schedule 14N notice as of the time they 
commenced oral solicitations.216 
Importantly, the exemption applied only to shareholder nominations 
conducted pursuant to Rule 14a-11. To the extent that shareholders attempted 
to nominate a director candidate through other mechanisms, such as state 
statutory rights or issuer-specific charter provisions, they would have been 
ineligible for the exemptive provisions of Rules 14a-2(b)(7) and (8). Now that 
 
 210 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,681 (“We remain concerned that the Federal proxy rules 
may not be facilitating the exercise of shareholders’ ability under State law to nominate and elect 
directors . . . .”). 
 211 See Fisch, supra note 5, at 1140–41 (describing regulatory requirements for the solicitation of proxies). 
 212 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,725. 
 213 See id. at 56,780–81. In addition to the new exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(7), shareholders could 
continue to use the exemption under Rule 14a-2(b)(2) for solicitations made to no more than ten persons. Id. at 
56,676. 
 214 Id. at 56,781. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. at 56,727. 
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Rule 14a-11 has been invalidated, shareholders’ efforts to form a group for the 
purpose of meeting a required minimum of nominating shareholders or 
seconders under issuer-specific nominating procedures will be regulated as 
proxy solicitations.217 
Second, once shareholders formed a nominating group pursuant to Rule 
14a-11 and filed a Schedule 14N, Rule 14a-2(b)(8) permitted them to solicit on 
behalf of their nominees, and against the issuer’s nominees, without filing a 
formal proxy statement.218 The rule only permitted such solicitations once the 
shareholders received notice from the issuer that their nominees would be 
included in the proxy statement.219 In addition, the rule required specific 
disclosures and obligated soliciting shareholders to file all written solicitation 
materials with the SEC.220 
Commentators raised the concern that these filing requirements imposed an 
unnecessary burden on shareholder efforts to organize a nominating group.221 
The SEC responded that the exemption was sufficient because it provided 
shareholders “with the opportunity to engage in activities for which they would 
otherwise need to file a proxy statement or have another exemption 
available.”222 The SEC did not explain how burdening efforts by shareholders 
to communicate about the prospect of nominating a director candidate was 
consistent with either the objectives of Rule 14a-11 or shareholders’ state law 
nominating rights. 
Other aspects of the federal securities laws increase the burden on 
shareholder collective action. Regulation 13D, for example, requires extensive 
disclosure from shareholder groups whose aggregate holdings exceed 5%.223 
Rule 13d-1(b) reduces the regulatory burden for most institutional investors by 
 
 217 See id. at 56,729 (“Given the range of possible criteria that companies and/or shareholders could 
establish for nominations, we continue to believe it would not be appropriate to extend the exemption to those 
circumstances.”). 
 218 See id. at 56,781. The SEC previously adopted Rules 14a-2(b)(1) and (6) to exempt proxy solicitations 
by disinterested shareholders from certain of the proxy rules, including the obligation to file a proxy statement. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1), (6) (2011). New Rule 14a-2(b)(8), which appears to be in effect despite the 
invalidation of Rule 14a-11, extends this protection to members of a nominating group, so long as they comply 
with the other requirements of Rule 14a-11. Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781. It is unclear how this 
rule operates in the absence of a valid Rule 14a-11. 
 219 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,781. 
 220 Id. 
 221 See id. at 56,726–27 (describing objections raised by commentators). 
 222 Id. at 56,727. 
 223 See §§ 240.13d-1(a), 13d-101. 
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permitting them to file the less burdensome Schedule 13G.224 Significantly, 
while a Schedule 13D must be filed within ten days after a shareholder passes 
the 5% threshold,225 a 13G need not be filed until forty-five days after the end 
of the calendar year in which the shareholder has passed the threshold.226 A 
13G filing is permitted, however, only for passive investors.227 SEC Rule 13d-
5(b)(1) explicitly extends the trigger for the disclosure requirements of section 
13(d) to group formation for the purpose of voting.228 
As part of the adopting release, the SEC amended the beneficial ownership 
reporting rules to provide that participation in the 14a-11 nominating 
procedure would not, by itself, cause an investor to forfeit its eligibility to file 
a Schedule 13G.229 The SEC refused, however, to relieve shareholders from 
the burden of filing a Schedule 13G if their aggregated holdings exceeded 5% 
and explicitly acknowledged that, as a result of aggregation, some new 
shareholders would be subject to the 13G filing requirement.230 In addition, the 
adopting release warned that a Schedule 13G filing would only be available to 
those shareholders that limited their activity to that permitted under Rule 14a-
11: “[A]ny activity other than those provided for under Rule 14a-11 [such as 
approaching the board and proposing strategic alternatives] would make the 
exception inapplicable.”231 
The prospect of avoiding filing obligations or potential liability under 
section 13(d) might, in itself, have created an incentive for shareholders to use 
Rule 14a-11 to obtain proxy access, rather than to experiment with alternative 
procedures.232 The invalidation of Rule 14a-11, however, appears to have 
rendered this amendment meaningless. As a result, shareholders that engage in 
 
 224 See id. § 240.13d-1(b) (describing conditions under which an investor may file a Schedule 13G in lieu 
of a Schedule 13D); id. § 240.13d-102 (setting forth information that must be included in a Schedule 13G 
filing). 
 225 Id. § 240.13d-1(a). 
 226 Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(2). 
 227 See Id. § 240.13d-1(b)(1)(i) (providing that an investor may not have acquired the securities “with the 
purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer”). 
 228 Id. § 240.13d-5(b)(1). See CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund Mgmt. (UK) LLP, 654 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 
2011) (describing how group formation triggers section 13(d) disclosure requirements). 
 229 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,676, 56,680 (describing the amendment to § 240.13d-
1(b)(1)(i)). 
 230 Id. at 56,751. 
 231 Id. at 56,736. 
 232 This regulatory advantage would potentially be far more important than any cost savings that proxy 
access would provide to an activist investor. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy 
Access, 97 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1405 (2011) (arguing that activists such as hedge funds would not use proxy 
access because the trivial value of the cost savings of proxy access would be outweighed by its disadvantages). 
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collective action in connection with efforts to nominate director candidates or 
adopt proxy access procedures risk being treated as a group for purposes of 
section 13(d) and being subject to the resulting disclosure requirements. 
Similarly, the SEC refused to create an exemption from the requirements of 
Exchange Act section 16 for shareholder groups with aggregated holdings that 
exceed 10%. The provisions of section 16, although triggered less frequently 
than those of Regulation 13D, are more onerous in that they are not limited to 
disclosure requirements. Members of a section 16 group are required to forfeit 
short-swing trading profits under appropriate circumstances to the 
corporation.233 Again, the SEC explicitly declined to exempt 14a-11 groups 
from the scope of section 16, explaining merely that, “[b]ecause the ownership 
threshold . . . for Rule 14a-11 eligibility is significantly less than 10%, 
shareholders will be able to form groups with holdings sufficient to meet the 
Rule 14a-11 threshold without reaching the 10% threshold in Section 16.”234 
Critical to the operation of Rule 14a-11 was new Schedule 14N.235 
Schedule 14N, which remains in effect despite the invalidation of Rule 14a-11 
and now applies to all shareholder efforts to nominate director candidates, 
requires extensive disclosure.236 The SEC has characterized the required 
disclosure as “similar to that currently required in a contested election.”237 The 
requirements are not limited to information about the nominees but include 
information about the nominating shareholders, such as disclosure of any legal 
proceeding in which any member of the nominating group has been involved 
during the past ten years.238 If members of the nominating group are 
corporations, the rule requires disclosure by officers, directors, and controlling 
persons.239 Because the nominating shareholders are not themselves up for 
election, this disclosure requirement seems somewhat intrusive, but the SEC 
explained “that the disclosures will enable shareholders to gauge the 
 
 233 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (Supp. IV 2010). 
 234 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,737. 
 235 17 C.F.R. § 240.14n-101 (2011). 
 236 The disclosure requirements in prior proposals were even more extensive. See, e.g., Annette L. 
Nazareth, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the International Corporate Governance Network (Oct. 29, 2007), 
available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch102907aln.htm (stating that the proposed disclosure 
requirements were “more extensive than those in a proxy contest” and “more extensive than that required of 
someone seeking to take over the company”). 
 237 Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/info/ 
smallbus/secg/14a-8-secg.htm (last updated Sept. 19, 2011). 
 238 § 240.14n-101(5)(d). 
 239 Id. § 240.14n-101(5)(c)–(d). 
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nominating shareholder’s or group’s interest in the company, longevity of 
ownership, and intent with regard to continued ownership in the company.”240 
The disclosure requirements also present a liability risk for shareholders 
considering the formation of a nominating group. Schedule 14N requires the 
nominating group to make various representations regarding the net economic 
interest of its members, the independence of the nominee, and the group’s 
intention to hold its stock through the date of the annual meeting.241 In 
addition, a Rule 14a-11 nominating group was required to certify that it did not 
have the intention to change the control of the issuer or to seek more board 
seats than permitted by the rule.242 The SEC explicitly noted in its adopting 
release that the nominee, nominating shareholder, and each member of any 
nominating group are potentially liable for any misrepresentations or omissions 
in the Schedule 14N and “any other related communication.”243 Nothing in the 
release limited liability to a group member’s representations about itself. This 
created the possibility that the SEC or courts would impose on group members 
the responsibility of verifying the veracity of each other’s shareholdings, 
relationships, and intentions. 
In short, the impediments to group formation were substantial, a factor that 
had to be considered within the context of the large number of shareholders 
required to create a qualifying group under Rule 14a-11, especially at the 
larger public companies. The impediments are more substantial with the 
invalidation of Rule 14a-11 and its limited exemptions, and make it impractical 
for issuers to adopt nominating procedures that require the formation of 
nominating groups. 
Disclosure, the practical and regulatory requirements associated with group 
formation, and the other elements of liability exposure make proxy access 
costly. Many institutional investors are already struggling with limited 
resources, making it difficult to allocate funding for proxy access. At public 
pension funds and unions, such allocations may generate political outrage. As 
Francis Byrd, a managing director at the Altman Group, a proxy solicitation 
 
 240 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,715. 
 241 See § 240.14n-101 (setting forth disclosure requirements). 
 242 Id. § 240.14n-101(8)(a)(1). 
 243 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,676 (“Final Rule 14a-9(c) makes clear that the nominating 
shareholder or group will be liable for any statement in the Schedule 14N or any other related communication 
that is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or that omits to state any material fact necessary to 
make the statements therein not false or misleading, regardless of whether that information is ultimately 
included in the company’s proxy statement.”). 
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firm, asks, “Can you imagine CalPERS or CalSTRS trying to justify spending 
$500,000 on a proxy contest, while the state is struggling to keep libraries 
open?”244 Similarly, many mutual funds, especially indexed funds, will have 
difficulty justifying the costs in the face of market pressure to reduce fees and 
provide competitive returns.245 
C. The Exclusivity of Federal Proxy Access 
The analysis in Part III.B suggests that few shareholders would have met 
the eligibility requirements of Rule 14a-11. Of those shareholders that 
qualified, many would not have been interested in shareholder activism. Those 
that both qualified and were interested would have faced major burdens in 
terms of compliance costs and liability exposure. One might infer from this 
analysis a lack of SEC enthusiasm for increasing shareholder nominations. 
Why did the SEC adopt a federal proxy access rule that did not provide proxy 
access? 
As indicated above, the SEC faced substantial challenges in adopting a 
proxy access rule. These challenges may have led the SEC to draft its rule 
narrowly, leaving the market to respond to any perceived deficiencies by 
providing shareholders with more extensive proxy access rights than those 
available under Rule 14a-11. Indeed, in the adopting release, the SEC stated 
that any deficiencies in federal proxy access could be addressed through 
private ordering.246 The SEC noted that shareholders can adopt issuer-specific 
nominating procedures that expand the rights provided under Rule 14a-11, 
such as reducing the requirements described in Part III.B above.247 Indeed, the 
accompanying amendments to Rule 14a-8 explicitly permitted the use of 
shareholder proposals to adopt issuer-specific nominating procedures.248 
 
 244 Preparing for the Dodd–Frank Act, ISS, http://www.issgovernance.com/weekly/20100723DoddFrank 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 245 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 140, at 1989 (describing Fidelity’s and Charles Schwab’s reductions of 
fund fees in an effort to compete with Vanguard funds). 
 246 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,693 (“Of course, to the extent that shareholders believe the 
3% threshold is too high our amendments to Rule 14a-8 will facilitate their ability to adopt a lower ownership 
percentage.”). 
 247 See id. at 56,755 (noting that issuers’ governing documents may be modified to “enhance[]” the 
benefits to shareholders by lowering the required ownership threshold or shortening the required holding 
period). 
 248 See id. at 56,759 (“With the adoption of the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders will be able 
to establish procedures that can further facilitate [their state law nominating power], if they wish.”). 
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Historically, federal regulation of proxy solicitation has disfavored issuer-
specific attempts at private ordering.249 As recounted above, the SEC rules 
prohibit issuers from adopting a universal ballot combining shareholder and 
management nominees. Although shareholders have always had the option of 
nominating director candidates by conducting an independent proxy 
solicitation, such a solicitation requires the shareholder to file a proxy 
statement and all solicitation materials with the SEC.250 The SEC directly 
opposed investor efforts to use the corporate bylaws to establish alternatives to 
a full-scale election contest.251 Even with the amendments to Rule 14a-8, 
shareholders that successfully propose and adopt issuer-specific nominating 
procedures will have to comply with the proxy solicitation rules that apply to a 
full election contest. In addition, shareholders that engage in collective action 
are subject to the disclosure requirements of section 13(d)252 and, to the extent 
their collective holdings exceed 10%, may also be subject to the short-swing 
trading limitations of section 16(b).253 
The SEC’s stated rationale for proxy access was to reduce existing 
impediments to shareholder exercise of state law nominating rights. With 
respect to shareholder nominations conducted through procedures other than 
now-invalid Rule 14a-11, however, the new rules did nothing to remove these 
impediments. Shareholders that nominate directors pursuant to state law, 
issuer-specific charter or bylaw provisions, or foreign law are not relieved 
from the filing requirements associated with a full-scale proxy solicitation. The 
 
 249 In its 2009 proposing release, the SEC observed that “the director nomination and shareholder 
proposal processes are two areas in which our current proxy rules pose impediments to the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights.” Proposing Release, supra note 7, at 29,026. Curiously, this statement is not included in 
the adopting release. 
 250 Independent solicitations are also costly. The ministerial costs of printing and mailing a proxy 
statement may be limited, see id. at 29,073 (estimating these costs at $18,000), although these costs depend on 
the size of the shareholder base. One proxy solicitation firm estimates that printing and mailing costs range 
from $4 to $6 per investor, resulting in a cost of $60,000 each time a shareholder conducts a mailing if the 
company has just 15,000 investors. Julie Connelly, Proxy Access: Worth Little More Than a Hill of Beans, 
CORP. BOARD MEMBER, Third Quarter 2010, at 50, 52. For General Electric, with five million shareholders, 
these costs are obviously much higher. Investing with GE: Investor Information, Investor Types, GE, http:// 
www.ge.com/investors/investing/index.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
In addition to the ministerial costs, however, the costs of a contested election include, at a minimum, 
legal fees, advertising, the costs of a proxy solicitation firm, and the costs of seeking the support of proxy 
advisors. Connelly, supra, at 51–52. By way of example, Carl Icahn stated that he spent over $1 million in his 
campaign to gain two board seats in 2009 at Biogen Idec. Id. at 51. 
 251 See AFSCME v. AIG, Inc., 462 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2006) (describing the SEC’s opposition to the 
inclusion of a shareholder-proposed bylaw amendment). 
 252 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006). 
 253 Id. § 78p(b). 
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SEC’s rule changes did not permit such shareholders, even if they did not seek 
control, to take advantage of the limited exemptions from the regulation of 
proxy solicitations under Rules 14a-2(b)(7) and 14a-2(b)(8). Indeed, 
shareholder efforts to experiment with nominating procedures by adopting 
firm-specific charter or bylaw provisions offer a nominating shareholder little 
advantage under current law over conducting an independent solicitation. 
Absent a reduction in the regulatory burdens, shareholders have little reason to 
adopt such procedures. 
D. Rationalizing Proxy Access 
The foregoing discussion highlights the destructive ambiguity in Rule 14a-
11. After so many years of debate, the SEC adopted a proxy access rule that 
held limited promise in terms of increasing shareholder access to the proxy. 
Even that limited promise was lost in the face of the SEC’s halfhearted defense 
of the rule. At the same time, the SEC’s regulation of proxy solicitations 
continues to forestall further attempts to increase shareholder nominating 
power through state law and private ordering. What explains this regulatory 
approach? Several explanations for the ambiguity in Rule 14a-11 are possible. 
First, Rule 14a-11 may simply have reflected caution. Faced with extensive 
controversy over the likely effects of proxy access, the SEC may have decided 
to draw the narrowest possible rule in an effort to test the waters. There are 
three problems with understanding Rule 14a-11 in these terms. First, as 
described in Part III.B above, the qualification requirements under Rule 14a-11 
were so stringent as to preclude virtually all shareholders from using it, making 
it unlikely that the rule would have provided policymakers with a basis for 
evaluating the efficacy of expanding shareholder nominating rights. Second, 
the limited number of shareholders that would have qualified to use the rule 
were not representative of other shareholders generally or activist shareholders 
in particular. Third, those shareholders that would have qualified to use Rule 
14a-11—those with the largest stakes—were precisely those shareholders that 
stood to gain the least from the rule because they had the financial resources 
and sophistication to nominate directors by running independent solicitations. 
Finally, as was evident from the opposition to Rule 14a-11 and the 
immediate court challenge, the SEC will face a substantial battle if it seeks to 
broaden proxy access in the future. Rule 14a-11’s brief life was likely the 
product of a rare opportunity—the confluence of the 2008 financial crisis and 
the impetus it supplied for regulatory reform coupled with a rise in the political 
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power of Democratic officials who were more receptive to shareholder 
interests. The effectiveness of these forces in generating regulatory reform has 
already decreased. Given the history of proxy access, SEC officials were 
presumably aware that the political climate offered them a rare opportunity to 
adopt a proxy access rule. They could not reasonably have anticipated an 
opportunity to expand the rule later. 
If Rule 14a-11 was not in fact an initial effort to ascertain the effects of 
increasing shareholder nominating rights, how should it be understood? 
Perhaps the SEC decided that this highly controversial battle was not the best 
use of its limited political capital. As indicated above, business interests 
expended tremendous resources opposing proxy access and predicting horrible 
effects that would flow from its adoption. The SEC was presented with 
empirical studies that, although seriously flawed, purported to demonstrate that 
proxy access would damage firm performance.254 The adopting release failed 
to confront these comments or to identify their flaws, suggesting the possibility 
that, in the end, comments from business groups persuaded SEC officials that 
proxy access was an undesirable governance change.255 Indeed, one might 
have accused the SEC of sandbagging its economic analysis to provide the 
 
 254 Commentators presented the SEC with two empirical studies purporting to show that the SEC’s 
proposed proxy access rules reduce shareholder wealth. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Measurement Issues in the 
Proxy Access Debate 2 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 71, 2010). The studies by 
Akyol and Larcker measured correlations between stock price movements and various significant news events 
concerning the likelihood that the SEC will adopt a proxy access rule. See Ali C. Akyol et al., Shareholders in 
the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations, 46 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1526081; David F. 
Larcker et al., The Regulation of Corporate Governance (May 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/The-Regulation-of-Corporate-Governance_ 
Larcker.pdf. A combination of problematic coding decisions and confounding events raises serious doubts 
about the studies’ empirical claims. In addition, a subsequent study employing a similar methodology reached 
the opposite conclusion. See Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence 
from the Business Roundtable Challenge 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-052, 2011), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/11-052.pdf (finding that the market placed a positive value on proxy access). 
Because the SEC does not discuss this research in its releases, it is impossible to determine the extent to which 
the research influenced the Commissioner’s views. 
 255 It is worth noting that business interests conducted a substantial number of in-person meetings with 
SEC officials in connection with the proxy access rule making. See Comments on Proposed Rule: Facilitating 
Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 68. Similar meetings were conducted with members of the 
institutional investor community. Id. Although the existence of these meetings is disclosed in the SEC 
comment files, the substance of the meetings is not. See, e.g., Memorandum from Kayla J. Gillan, Deputy 
Chief of Staff, SEC, to File No. S7-10-09 (Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-
09/s71009-648.pdf (reporting a meeting between SEC officials and the chair of the ABA’s Corporate Laws 
Committee and stating that “[a]mong the topics discussed were the Commission’s proposed rules regarding 
facilitating shareholder director nominations”). 
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D.C. Circuit with an easy basis for invalidating the rule. After all, the D.C. 
Circuit had previously warned the SEC of its obligation to consider the 
economic consequences of its rules.256 
Why then adopt a proxy access rule at all? The Obama Administration and 
the SEC leadership had made a variety of public statements avowing their 
support for proxy access.257 A failure to adopt any rule may have been viewed 
as a sign of weakness or as catering to the opponents of proxy access. 
Members of the press who had been following the battle over proxy access 
with interest touted the adoption of the rule as a shareholder victory despite the 
rule’s limitations.258 Some institutional investors publicly defended the rule, 
stating that its limitations would ensure that shareholders selected director 
candidates who enjoyed broad support.259 Notably, the last-minute changes to 
the prerequisites for using Rule 14a-11, changes that dramatically limited the 
scope of the rule, received limited public attention.260 
Alternatively, the SEC may justifiably have been concerned about the 
litigation challenge that any proxy access rule was likely to face. In recent 
years, the SEC’s rule making, particularly rule making opposed by business 
groups, has been repeatedly challenged through litigation. A number of these 
challenges have been successful, resulting in the invalidation of SEC rules and, 
 
 256 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating SEC rules 
regulating mutual fund governance and noting the SEC’s “statutory obligation to determine as best it can the 
economic implications of the rule it has proposed”). 
 257 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Activists, Take Note: SEC Delays a Proxy Vote, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2009, 
at B3 (describing SEC Chair Mary Schapiro as having “championed the proxy-access proposal in response to 
the financial crisis”); Kara Scannell, Corporate News: Policy Makers Work to Give Shareholders More 
Boardroom Clout, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, at B4 (reporting that three of five SEC Commissioners publicly 
stated their support for proxy access). Although President Obama did not address proxy access directly, he 
publicly supported increased shareholder voice, including sponsoring Say on Pay legislation, while in the 
Senate. See Matthew Kirdahy, Say-on-Pay Edges Closer to Law, FORBES.COM (Nov. 11, 2008, 3:15 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/11/11/say-on-pay-lead-compensation-cx_mk_1110corpgovernance.html. 
 258 E.g., Jessica Holz & Dennis Berman, Investors Gain New Clout, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2010, at A1 
(stating that the rule gives investors “greater sway” in the selection of directors). 
 259 See, e.g., Letter from Donna F. Anderson, Vice President & Global Governance Analyst, T. Rowe 
Price Assocs., Inc., and Darrell N. Braman, Vice President & Managing Counsel, T. Rowe Price Assocs., Inc., 
to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09 
/s71009-218.pdf (“[T]he rule should be structured to encourage collaboration among investors so as to increase 
the likelihood that contested elections of non-controlling slates of directors take place primarily at companies 
where there is broad consensus among shareholders that a change in the boardroom is warranted.”). 
 260 The Administration appeared to back away from proxy access at the eleventh hour, proposing a 
measure that would have required a 5% ownership threshold—even higher than that adopted by the SEC. See 
White House Intervenes to Weaken Corporate Governance Bill, COMPLIANCE INTELLIGENCE (June 18, 2010), 
http://complianceintel.com/articleprint.aspx?articleid=2603470&single=true. 
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more significantly, the dismantling of controversial SEC reform efforts. 
Notable examples include Goldstein v. SEC, in which the D.C. Circuit 
invalidated the SEC’s effort to require registration of hedge funds,261 and 
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, in which the court overturned SEC rules 
imposing increased independence requirements on mutual fund boards.262 The 
decisions have reduced the SEC’s credibility and power in pursuing its 
regulatory agenda. 
SEC Chair Mary Schapiro clearly anticipated a legal challenge to whatever 
proxy access rule the Commission adopted.263 The SEC may have believed, 
however, albeit erroneously, that adopting a highly restrictive rule would 
reduce the incentive for business interests to challenge the rule or reduce the 
willingness of the D.C. Circuit to invalidate such a rule. It is plausible to 
believe that business interests might have been deterred from challenging a 
proxy access rule if its requirements were so stringent as to make its use 
virtually impossible. This may also explain the lack of protection afforded to 
private ordering; a regulatory approach that reduces the incentive for 
institutional investors to push for greater access through state law or private 
ordering favors business interests. 
It is possible that the SEC saw proxy access, like the shareholder proposal 
rule, not as a tool for increasing the effectiveness of shareholder voting but as a 
communication device. The SEC has long defended the value of shareholder 
proposals in communicating shareholder views to management;264 indeed, the 
shareholder proposal rule existed and was used for four decades despite the 
fact that shareholder proposals virtually never received majority approval.265 
 
 261 451 F.3d 873, 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 262 412 F.3d 133, 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005); accord Am. Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 572 F.3d 923, 936 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (invalidating SEC regulation of indexed annuities), amended by 613 F.3d 166 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); Fin. Planning Ass’n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating an SEC effort to exempt 
broker-dealers from certain statutory requirements). 
 263 See Martha Graybow, Schapiro Braces for Fight over Proxy Access, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2009, 1:56 
PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE53S6I520090429 (paraphrasing Schapiro as saying that 
“litigation may result from whatever rule change is endorsed”). 
 264 See, e.g., Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 
Investment Company Act Release No. 23,200, 63 Fed. Reg. 29,106, 29,108 (May 28, 1998) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8) (explaining, as basis for overturning its prior controversial Cracker Barrel no-action 
position, that “we have gained a better understanding of the depth of interest among shareholders in having an 
opportunity to express their views to company management on employment-related proposals that raise 
sufficiently significant social policy issues”). 
 265 See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 
ALA. L. REV. 879, 883 (1994) (“As of 1981, only two contested shareholder proposals of the thousands 
submitted had ever won.”). 
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The “proposals-as-communication” perspective is reflected in the SEC’s 
encouragement of nonbinding or precatory proposals,266 proposals that have no 
predicate in state law and that Vice Chancellor Strine has termed “imaginary 
voting.”267 Although precatory proposals have no legal effect even if they 
receive majority approval, they enable shareholders to communicate with each 
other.268 Senator Dodd defended precatory proposals as providing shareholders 
with “an essential democratic shareholder right to speak to each other.”269 This 
view of shareholder voting as a communication device is also reflected in the 
advisory votes on executive compensation mandated by Dodd–Frank.270 
Like the submission of a precatory proposal, filing a Schedule 14N enables 
shareholders to communicate their dissatisfaction with the issuer’s board 
candidates even if the shareholders do not succeed in assembling a nominating 
group or electing a shareholder nominee to the board. Indeed, the practical 
obstacles to successful shareholder use of Rule 14a-11 were unimportant if the 
rule was not designed to enable shareholders to nominate and elect director 
candidates. 
Further support for this communication reading of Rule 14a-11 can be 
found in the SEC’s decision to extend its coverage to controlled companies. In 
controlled companies, minority shareholders—those other than the controlling 
shareholder—lack sufficient voting power to influence director elections. 
Despite the seeming futility of a rule allowing minority shareholders at such 
companies to nominate directors, the SEC refused to exempt controlled 
companies from the rule.271 In so doing, the SEC conceded that the purpose of 
allowing proxy access at these companies was not to further the election of 
 
 266 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 54–55 (describing the SEC’s “creat[ion]” of the precatory proposal in 
1976). 
 267 Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2007), www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf; accord 
Strine, supra note 5, at 1088 (describing precatory proposals as “a pretend polity under Rule 14a-8 that had no 
reference to principles of state law” (footnote omitted)). 
 268 See, e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Shareholder Rights, the 2008 Proxy Season, and the Impact of 
Shareholder Activism, Address Before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (July 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch072208psa.htm (describing and criticizing precatory proposals). 
 269 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Dodd Stands Up for 
Shareholder Rights (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm? 
FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=796095f1-ade9-4777-9b56-587b06cf6430&Regio 
n_id=&Issue_id=. 
 270 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1899–1900 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (Supp. IV 2010)) (requiring the SEC to 
adopt rules requiring advisory votes on Say on Pay). 
 271 See Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,685–86. 
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shareholder-nominated directors: “[T]hough applying Rule 14a-11 to 
controlled companies would be unlikely to result in the election of shareholder-
nominated directors . . . , we appreciate that shareholders at controlled 
companies may have other reasons for nominating candidates for director.”272 
A related theory is that Rule 14a-11 was designed to raise the level of 
director discomfort without presenting a real threat of contested elections. 
Public company directors are highly sensitive to visible criticism. Withhold 
votes and negative Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) recommendations, 
even in the context of an uncontested election in which the directors face no 
realistic threat of replacement, cause them concern.273 As a result, proxy access 
may be understood to offer institutions a bargaining chip with which they 
could demand board responsiveness or at least board attention in exchange for 
foregoing the steps associated with forming a nominating group. 
Finally, the SEC may simply have lost perspective. After years of 
considering proxy access—years in which opponents raised vigorous 
challenges to every proposed rule-making effort—the SEC was derailed by the 
effort to address each of these potential challenges.274 Each response led, in 
turn, to additional line drawing. Commentators argued, for example, that 
activist shareholders would use proxy access to circumvent the rules governing 
control contests.275 Rather than evaluating whether the disclosure requirements 
of Schedule 14N and the other restrictions of Rule 14a-11 provided adequate 
protection in the context of a control contest,276 the SEC attempted to identify 
 
 272 Id. 
 273 See AMY L. GOODMAN ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SEC PROXY AND COMPENSATION RULES § 10.03 
(5th ed. 2010) (describing issuer compliance with ISS policy guidelines to avoid withhold recommendations). 
 274 In part, this response may be a byproduct of the notice-and-comment rule-making process. Over the 
years, as the SEC has attempted to structure its rule making to consider all possible arguments and objections 
to proxy access, its proposals have become increasingly complex. As James McRitchie puts it: 
I’m afraid too many will be distracted by the hundreds of questions raised by the SEC, the 
labyrinth of language only an SEC attorney could love, and the need to arrive at a consensus 
document that all with a vested interest in the status quo can at least live with. 
James McRitchie, Proxy Access, CORPGOV.NET (Aug. 20, 2009), http://corpgov.net/2009/08/proxy-access/. 
 275 See, e.g., Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al. to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3–4 
(Aug. 17, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-212.pdf (identifying provisions 
of Rule 14a-11 that, in combination, might allow shareholders to obtain a change in control). 
 276 Significantly, most contested solicitations for director elections include shareholder nominations for 
only a minority of board seats. See SEC Grants No-Action Relief to Activist Shareholders Seeking to “Round 
Out” Short Slates with Each Other’s Nominees, GIBSON DUNN (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/ 
publications/pages/SECGrantsNo-ActionReliefToActivistShareholdersSeekingtoRoundOutShortSlates.aspx 
(explaining that running a “short slate” has become “the preferred approach for dissidents seeking board 
representation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Among the reasons for this approach is that proxy 
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the appropriate percentage of director candidates that would not pose a control 
threat.277 Limiting the number of nominees forced the SEC, in turn, to 
formulate procedures to choose among candidates proposed by multiple 
nominating groups.278 
The same can be said for the required ownership threshold and holding 
period. Critics warned that proxy access would give union pension funds and 
other special interest groups a tool to use against existing management.279 The 
SEC responded by adopting a 3% ownership requirement—effectively 
precluding unions and similar special interest groups from using the rule. 
Critics expressed concern about the short-term objectives of hedge funds, 
which frequently assemble holdings of greater than 3%.280 The SEC again 
responded by imposing a three-year holding period designed to preclude hedge 
funds as well. As former Commissioner Paul Atkins explained it, the SEC was 
attempting “to find the magic number where ‘good’ shareholder groups (like 
state pension funds) are in, but ‘bad’ groups (politically incorrect shareholders, 
like hedge funds) are out.”281 
The SEC’s efforts to avoid all possible bad effects or “unintended 
consequences”282 may have led it to choose instead a rule that would have had 
no consequences, intended or otherwise. Importantly, the SEC’s focus was 
seemingly on avoiding bad consequences rather than identifying an affirmative 
value to increasing shareholder nominating power and determining the changes 
necessary to achieve that value. This evaluation, of course, would have brought 
the SEC into the core of the corporate governance debate, an area the SEC has 
 
advisors, such as ISS, are more likely to support activists who are not seeking to replace a majority of the 
board. Id. 
 277 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,706–07 (explaining the rationale for the limitation of 25% in 
terms of preventing the use of Rule 14a-11 for control contests). 
 278 Id. at 56,710–11. 
 279 See, e.g., Christine Hall, Dodd–Corker Fed Bill May Contain Left-Wing “Shareholder” Power Grab, 
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 3, 2010), http://cei.org/news-releases/dodd-corker-fed-bill-may-contain-
left-wing-shareholder-power-grab (reporting that a coalition of seventeen groups expressed these concerns in 
opposition to Dodd–Frank’s proposed proxy access provision). 
 280 See, e.g., Letter from Darla C. Stuckey, Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys & Governance Prof’ls, to Elizabeth 
M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-
610.pdf (“[M]any hedge funds seek to direct the operations of a company with a view to short-term 
profitability or otherwise to the detriment of the long-term interest of companies and their shareholders.”). 
 281 Paul Atkins, The SEC’s Sop to Unions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2010, at A15. 
 282 Melissa Klein Aguilar, Proxy Access Debate Rages On, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Aug. 18, 2009), http:// 
www.complianceweek.com/article/5545/proxy-access-debate-rages-on. 
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struggled to avoid since the 1990 Business Roundtable decision.283 Any debate 
over proxy access that fails to evaluate its effect on the allocation of power 
between shareholders and managers is, however, destructively ambiguous 
because the best argument in favor of proxy access—increasing board 
accountability—requires that proxy access increase shareholder power. 
Similarly, the most potent arguments against proxy access are based on claims 
that increasing shareholder power is ill-advised. In the following section, this 
Article turns to the corporate governance debate and demonstrates how the role 
of proxy access within the context of corporate governance highlights the 
limitations of federal rule making. 
IV.  PROXY ACCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The SEC’s failure to articulate a normative justification for proxy access 
was the primary source of the ambiguity in Rule 14a-11. The SEC did not offer 
empirical support for the proposition that U.S. corporate governance is 
defective or explain how the proxy access provided by Rule 14a-11 would 
improve it.284 Nor did the SEC provide a theory as to how shareholders might, 
through proxy access, increase board accountability. The SEC did not 
demonstrate that public company boards are insufficiently responsive to 
shareholder interests; indeed, some scholars have argued that the 2008 
financial crisis was exacerbated by an excessive focus on shareholder 
interests.285 Nor did the SEC explain how the nomination and election of 
directors representing a minority of the board is likely to impact board decision 
making.286 
These questions about the desirability of proxy access implicate 
fundamental issues of corporate governance—determining the optimal 
 
 283 See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 
783–84 (1994) (explaining the SEC’s caution in regulating corporate governance because of ongoing questions 
over its statutory authority to do so). 
 284 Commentators are divided on this point. Compare Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance 
“Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009) (arguing 
that the financial failure did not demonstrate the existence of a governance problem), with Grant Kirkpatrick, 
Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 2009 OECD J.: FIN. MARKET TRENDS, no. 1, at 61 
(identifying failures in board oversight as a substantial factor contributing to the financial crisis). 
 285 See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 720–22 (2010) (explaining that focus on shareholder value maximization led financial 
firms to take excessive risks). 
 286 At least one study has considered the impact on stock returns of a dissident obtaining minority board 
representation. See CERNICH ET AL., supra note 4, at 25–37 (surveying 120 hybrid boards and evaluating their 
effect on governance structures and shareholder value). 
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equilibrium between management and shareholder power, evaluating the extent 
to which the existing allocation of power has deviated from that optimal 
balance, and assessing whether the regulatory reform under consideration is 
likely to restore that balance. Critics and commentators strongly disagree about 
these points.287 Reviewing and evaluating that debate is a difficult task that 
extends beyond the scope of this Article. The challenges presented by this task 
create substantial impediments to SEC efforts to regulate shareholder 
nominating power through a federal proxy access rule. In this Part, this Article 
identifies the problems inherent in mandatory federal regulation of corporate 
governance. 
A. Proxy Access and Corporate Governance 
Shareholder nominating power—which, in turn, is an element of 
shareholder voting power—is a component of corporate governance: the 
mechanisms that allocate power between shareholders and management.288 
This allocation of power addresses operational decision making and, in the 
public corporation, attempts to minimize the agency costs that result from the 
separation of ownership and control.289 Critically, to function well, corporate 
governance must maintain a balance between managerial and shareholder 
power.290 Excess managerial power increases managerial agency costs.291 
Excess shareholder power creates inefficiency and may, in some cases, create 
intrashareholder agency costs.292 
 
 287 Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
836 (2005) (arguing that the existing allocation of power is insufficient to enable shareholders to initiate value-
increasing changes), with Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 561, 579–83 (2006) (arguing that large shareholders will use any increase in shareholder power to obtain 
private gains at the expense of the firm and other shareholders), and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1758 (2006) (claiming that the 
existing system of limited shareholder voting rights provides “substantial efficiency benefits”). 
 288 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 2 (2008) 
(explaining that corporate governance is a “framework of institutions and processes” that, “[t]aken 
together, . . determine how power within a company is exercised”); id. at 50 tbl.3.1 (listing major corporate 
governance mechanisms for U.S. public companies). 
 289 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976) (describing agency costs that result from 
separation of ownership and control). 
 290 See id. 
 291 See id. 
 292 See Nina Walton, On the Optimal Allocation of Power Between Shareholders and Managers (Univ. of 
S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 118, 2011), available at http://law.bepress. 
com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1172&context=usclwps (modeling governance rules in an effort to evaluate 
this trade-off). 
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A variety of governance mechanisms contribute to the balance of power in 
the public corporation. Internal governance mechanisms include the allocation 
of decision-making authority established by the corporation’s statute, charter, 
and bylaws as well as the ability of shareholders to impose accountability on 
director decisions through their power to elect and remove board members. 
Internal governance mechanisms also include the poison pill, which increases 
management power in the takeover context,293 and the ability of shareholders 
to call a special meeting, which enhances shareholder power.294 External 
governance mechanisms include gatekeepers such as credit rating agencies, 
regulators, and the disciplinary effect of the capital markets.295 
Evaluating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms or changes to 
those mechanisms is difficult. First, a specific governance mechanism does not 
exist in isolation. Its effectiveness is based on its interaction with other aspects 
of a firm’s governance structure. Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian, for 
example, found that the impact of a staggered board on management power to 
resist a takeover attempt was greatly enhanced when the staggered board was 
coupled with a poison pill.296 Similarly, Coates has noted that the effects of 
staggered boards, which are typically viewed as a powerful management 
entrenchment device, are avoidable in companies at which shareholders have 
the right to expand the board or remove directors without cause.297 Alternative 
governance mechanisms may also serve as substitutes.298 
 
 293 See Shira Ovide, Marty Lipton: Why I Invented the Poison Pill, WALL ST. J. DEAL J. BLOG (Dec. 29, 
2010, 1:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/12/29/marty-lipton-why-i-invented-the-poison-pill/ 
(paraphrasing Marty Lipton as explaining that he invented the poison pill “to give boards of a target company 
a chance to ‘level the playing field’”). 
 294 See Ted Allen, Showdown over Special Meetings, ISS (Jan. 20, 2010, 1:36 PM), http://blog. 
issgovernance.com/gov/2010/01/showdown-over-special-meetingssubmitted-by-ted-allen-publications.html 
(explaining the controversy over proposals that give shareholders the right to call special meetings). 
 295 See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 288, at 50 tbl.3.1. 
 296 Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, 
and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904 (2002) (“Pills made staggered boards important.”). 
 297 See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1301, 1352 tbl.3 (2001) (finding that these provisions made the staggered boards ineffective for 18% of 
issuers in the study). 
 298 See Greg Hallman et al., Carrots and Sticks: The Threat of Dismissal and Incentive Compensation 3–5 
(Oct. 21, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.areuea.org/conferences/pdf/52/723.pdf 
(describing the substitution effect of two governance mechanisms in management compensation—the threat of 
termination and pay for performance). 
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Internal and external governance mechanisms further interact.299 For 
example, scholars have devoted the greatest effort to attempting to assess the 
impact of antitakeover mechanisms on corporate performance based on the 
premise that, by reducing the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate 
control, antitakeover mechanisms reduce board and management 
accountability. Studies of any specific antitakeover mechanism are difficult to 
evaluate, however, in that an issuer’s susceptibility to a takeover is a function 
of a multiplicity of governance mechanisms that may include a poison pill and 
a staggered board, a state antitakeover statute, and judicially adopted legal 
standards for review of a board’s conduct in the takeover context.300 
The second challenge in evaluating governance mechanisms is that their 
effectiveness depends on firm-specific characteristics, including the firm’s 
existing management team, its shareholder base, and its life-cycle stage. A firm 
with a long-term, imperial CEO, for example, may require greater director 
independence. A mature company may be run by managers who are unduly 
inclined to engage in empire-building mergers or to retain excessive cash 
flows. Firms owned by a high percentage of retail investors may face excessive 
free riding and apathy, while those with many activist owners may be 
influenced by short-termism or conflicting shareholder objectives. The very 
governance mechanisms that are valuable for some firms impose excessive 
costs upon others. In particular, increasing board accountability by enhancing 
shareholder power is likely to be valuable for poorly managed firms and 
wasteful, at best, for well run issuers.301 
Finally, the governance needs of issuers are dynamic. In addition to the 
firm-specific factors described above, which can change over the life cycle of 
an issuer, a variety of market, economic, and even political developments can 
disrupt the equilibrium between management and shareholder power.302 The 
 
 299 See Stuart L. Gillan et al., Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions 
(John L. Weinberg Ctr. for Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 2003-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=442740 (explaining that such mechanisms “interact to determine a firm’s governance 
environment”). 
 300 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Picking a Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 471 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTA 
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)) (questioning event studies that analyze the 
wealth effect of antitakeover mechanisms without controlling for other factors that affect the firm’s 
vulnerability to execute a takeover). 
 301 See id. at 469 (explaining how provisions that increase management discretion may increase the value 
of well-managed firms but decrease the value of poorly managed firms). 
 302 Similarly, such developments can change the effect of specific governance mechanisms. Robert Daines 
conducted a highly publicized study concluding that Delaware incorporation was associated with increased 
firm value. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 555 (2001). 
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dramatic increase in the institutionalization of the U.S. securities markets, for 
example, has increased the potential disciplinary effect of shareholder voting 
power.303 The adoption by many firms of majority voting is likely to have a 
similar effect.304 In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
Unitrin standard305 enhanced management power by reducing the susceptibility 
of issuers to the discipline of the takeover market.306 
Several distinctive features render state corporate law robust to firm-
specific differences and market and regulatory developments, as discussed in 
more detail below. First, state law is largely enabling, rather than mandatory. 
Second, state law is subject to regulatory competition.307 Third, the 
development of state law is incremental. These features, which are absent in 
federal securities regulation, enable state law to maintain an equilibrium in the 
allocation of power between managers and shareholders. 
Although state corporation statutes constrain some issuer choices, in most 
cases, state statutes provide default rules that enable issuers to customize their 
governance structures. With respect to shareholder power to elect directors, for 
example, statutes offer a variety of choices, allowing shareholders to elect 
directors through majority or plurality voting, permitting supermajority voting 
requirements, and authorizing special voting structures, such as staggered 
 
Daines identified Delaware’s takeover law as one possible explanation for this result. Id. When Guhan 
Subramanian extended Daines’s analysis for a subsequent time period, he found that the “Delaware effect” had 
disappeared. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 33 (2004). 
One possible explanation for the difference was a change in the importance of state takeover law between the 
respective time periods. Id. at 52–53. 
 303 See Fisch, supra note 159, at 879–80 (citing statistics on the growth in institutional ownership of 
publicly traded equity). 
 304 See J.W. Verret, Pandora’s Ballot Box, or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting, Corporate Ballot 
Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 BUS. LAW. 1007, 1009 (2007) (explaining how 
majority voting “could serve to alter significantly the balance of power between shareholders and board 
members”). 
 305 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373–74 (Del. 1995). 
 306 In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that proportionality review under Unocal required an 
assessment of whether the defensive measure was “preclusive” or “coercive” and, if not, whether it fell within 
a “range of reasonableness.” Id. at 1387–89; see also Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 947, 967–68 (2001) (explaining how the Unitrin decision disrupted the director–shareholder balance of 
power). 
 307 Although issuers can elect to incorporate in any state, the majority of public corporations incorporate 
in Delaware. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000). I have argued that the flexibility and responsiveness of 
Delaware corporate law are distinctive features that explain, in part, Delaware’s attractiveness as a state of 
incorporation. See id. at 1064. Consequently, the following discussion focuses heavily on Delaware law. 
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boards, cumulative voting, tenured voting, and nonvoting stock.308 Statutes 
enable firms to allocate voting rights among multiple share classes and, in 
some cases, permit corporations to grant nonshareholders the right to elect 
directors.309 State law also permits issuers to adopt charter and bylaw 
provisions that limit or condition shareholder nominating power, such as 
qualification requirements for directors and advance notice bylaws.310 
This enabling character allows firms to fine-tune their governance 
structures to reflect differences in their shareholder bases, the extent to which 
they have a high percentage of institutional investors, the need to protect 
distinctive shareholder groups such as founding families, the extent to which 
managers are substantial shareholders, and so forth. Fundamentally, the range 
of available choices reflects the fact that the optimal structure and distribution 
of voting power will not be identical for all firms and that customization will 
increase the efficiency of the shareholder franchise. The enabling approach 
also furthers experimentation. Issuers can introduce a variety of mechanisms 
for increasing shareholder participation in the selection of directors, and their 
workability and legality can be assessed on a case-by-case basis.311 
The flexibility provided by enabling statutes is further enhanced by 
regulatory competition. Corporate law allows corporations to choose the state 
in which they are incorporated and, as a result, the law that will govern the 
corporation’s internal affairs. Regulatory competition enables issuers to choose 
from a menu of corporate structures and features and creates a natural 
experiment in the effectiveness of specific governance provisions. Regulatory 
competition provides two independent values. First, state differences allow 
product differentiation. Nevada offers a legal regime that is particularly 
management-friendly,312 for example, and North Dakota recently adopted a 
 
 308 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 408–10 
(1983). 
 309 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 703(a) (McKinney 2003) (authorizing the certificate of 
incorporation to provide bondholders with the right to elect one or more directors). 
 310 See, e.g., JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 2008) (upholding 
board power to adopt advance notice bylaws). 
 311 See Strine, supra note 5, at 1098 (explaining how the enabling approach enables “livable 
practices . . . to emerge and awkward ones to be discarded,” judicial review to test the validity of new 
practices, and “state statute writers” to address dissatisfaction with the judiciary’s treatment). 
 312 See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on 
the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1856 (2002) (describing 
Nevada’s distinctive provisions and observing that “Nevada has 15% of the non-Delaware out-of-state 
incorporations market”). 
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distinctively shareholder-friendly regime.313 Second, individual states provide 
laboratories for experimentation with innovations that can be subjected to a 
market test and, if successful, adopted more broadly. State antitakeover 
statutes314 and statutes authorizing director exculpation provisions in corporate 
charters315 are two examples in which such innovations spread and, over time, 
were adopted by the majority of states.316 
Third, the development of state law is incremental.317 State judicial 
decisions employ a common law methodology that maintains consistency and 
stability while providing the flexibility for courts to adapt legal rules to new 
developments.318 The Delaware cases concerning the scope of director 
fiduciary duties in the takeover context,319 for example, involved a series of 
adjustments to the relative power of shareholders and boards, adjustments that 
were able to reflect changes in the structure of hostile tender offers, the 
development of financing structures, such as junk bonds, and the interaction of 
state fiduciary principles with other regulatory developments, such as state 
antitakeover statutes and the Williams Act.320 
Legislative intervention, which frequently occurs as a response to issues 
that have been developed through the factual context of specific disputes, 
 
 313 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-01 to -33 (2007). 
 314 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 735–36 (1998) 
(describing the spread of state antitakeover statutes). 
 315 See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 
1155, 1160 (1990) (describing how Delaware’s innovative provision authorizing director exculpation “diffused 
rapidly among the states”). 
 316 See Carney, supra note 314, at 737–41 (citing other examples of provisions that spread among states). 
 317 See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New 
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 683 (2005) (describing incremental evolution of 
Delaware corporate law through Chancery Court decisions). 
 318 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 4 (1982) (“The incremental 
nature of common law adjudication meant that no single judge could ultimately change the law, and a series of 
judges could only do so over time and in response to changed events or to changed attitudes in the people.”). 
 319 A similar evolution can be seen in the Delaware decisions over the duty of good faith. Initially, a series 
of decisions seemed to articulate good faith as a distinctive fiduciary duty, supplementing the preexisting 
duties of care and loyalty. E.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of 
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good faith.”). Perhaps in 
response to subsequent lawsuits that suggested that the duty had the potential to create excessive litigation, 
thereby chilling the board’s discretionary decision making, the courts cut back, retreating from the 
characterization of good faith as a separate duty and limiting the scope of its reach. E.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 
A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary 
duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”). 
 320 See Regan, supra note 306, at 951–70 (recounting the evolution of Delaware case law concerning 
director fiduciary duties in the takeover context). 
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offers a corrective measure for reconsideration of judicially created rules. 
Unlike federal regulation, which is typically an initial regulatory response, 
corporate legislation is frequently a second step, taken after courts have 
attempted to apply existing legal rules to a variety of fact patterns and the 
legislature has been able to observe the consequences.321 As Ed Rock explains, 
“[T]he Delaware legislature and courts cannot promulgate ex ante the 
standards to govern new situations until they see a variety of cases and figure 
out how well or badly people behaved.”322 Thus, after the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom323 appeared to subject outside 
directors to excessive liability risk, the legislature authorized director 
exculpation charter provisions.324 When the Supreme Court rejected a proxy 
reimbursement bylaw as invalid under Delaware law,325 the legislature 
amended the statute to authorize proxy reimbursement bylaws.326 
B. Federalizing Proxy Access 
Federal proxy access offers none of the advantages of state corporate 
governance described in the preceding section. As a general matter, federal 
regulation does not provide the opportunities for experimentation and variation 
offered by state law. Federal regulation imposes mandatory and uniform rules 
on issuers and limits the options for opting out of these rules.327 Mandatory 
rules increase the stakes involved for regulators such as the SEC in 
ascertaining the optimal regulatory structure. They also reduce the potential for 
competition and the market to discipline politically motivated choices that may 
be inefficient.328 In contrast, rules that allow issuer-specific choice produce 
valuable evidence on the efficiency of regulatory choices, both directly by 
producing the variation needed to assess the effects of the rules and indirectly 
by prompting issuers to opt out of inefficient regulation.329 
 
 321 See Strine, supra note 5, at 1098 (“[I]f either the stockholders or managers are dissatisfied by the 
judiciary’s treatment of those proposals, pressure will be put on state statute writers to address their 
concerns.”). 
 322 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1009, 1102 (1997). 
 323 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 324 Romano, supra note 315, at 1160. 
 325 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 239–40 (Del. 2008). 
 326 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (Supp. 2011). 
 327 See ROMANO, supra note 300, at 86–96 (summarizing arguments in the debate over mandatory versus 
enabling corporate law). 
 328 See id. at 82–83. 
 329 An example is the takeover context. Empirical studies reported a substantial negative price effect on 
issuers that were subject to the restrictive Pennsylvania antitakeover statute. See, e.g., P.R. Chandy et al., The 
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That is not to say that mandatory rules are always inappropriate. As the 
preceding section has explained, however, uniform national rules are likely to 
be suboptimal tools for regulating corporate governance. In particular, 
shareholder nominating power is embedded in the state regulatory framework 
of shareholder voting. State law is the source of shareholder voting power. 
State law provides the tools by which issuers can customize shareholder voting 
power through charter and bylaw provisions. State law supplies the fiduciary 
principles that limit management power to interfere with shareholder voting 
rights.330 Shareholder nominating rights interact with both the scope of their 
substantive voting rights and the structural mechanisms that govern the voting 
process. 
Both this interaction and the difficulty of evaluating the effect of corporate 
governance regulation create challenges for the regulation of shareholder 
nominating power. Federal regulation is poorly suited for the kind of 
experimentation that is particularly valuable in an area in which it is difficult, 
ex ante, to identify the optimal regulatory approach.331 The process is 
complicated by the heavily politicized nature of the SEC rule-making process. 
The massive letter-writing campaigns and lobbying efforts associated with the 
SEC’s consideration of proxy access contributed to regulatory gridlock and 
vastly complicated the task of structuring the regulation. The nature of proxy 
access, which involves a shift of power from concentrated and well-funded 
corporate managers to dispersed investors with comparatively small stakes, 
increased the potential that the rule-making record would be distorted.332 
Under private ordering, issuers could vary their nominating procedures, and 
 
Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth Generation Anti-Takeover Law, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 399, 
403 (1995). Because the statute provided an opt-out provision, however, issuers could and did avoid the price 
effect by exercising their ability to opt out. See id. 
 330 See, e.g., Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (articulating the heightened 
standard of “compelling justification” for review for board decisions that interfere with the shareholder 
franchise). 
 331 As Vice Chancellor Strine explains, private ordering through issuer-specific bylaws enables “the 
market [to] assess what works best without the high costs that come with the imposition of an unproven, 
invariable mandate.” Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long 
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2010). 
 332 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 62–63 (1994) (explaining how concentrated groups 
with large stakes can present distorted pictures of the public interest to political officials); cf. Letter from 
Joseph A. Grundfest, Co-Dir., Rock Ctr. on Corporate Governance, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Jan. 
18, 2010), available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-599.pdf (attaching a working paper for the 
purpose of “drawing the Commission’s attention” to two highly flawed empirical studies that demonstrated, 
according to the commentator, that “proxy access . . . is inimical to the best interests of the shareholder 
community as a whole”). 
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one issuer’s approach could differ from that of its competitor. This variation 
eliminates the pressure to ensure that a single mandated rule is optimal. 
Nor can federal regulation be defended, in the context of proxy access, as a 
necessary response to the inability of shareholders to obtain minimally 
acceptable levels of proxy access through state law and private ordering.333 
First, as indicated above, the level of proxy access that Rule 14a-11 provided 
to investors was truly minimal. To the extent that few, if any, shareholders 
would have qualified to use Rule 14a-11 and that those few qualifying 
shareholders already had sufficient access to the proxy by mounting an election 
contest, Rule 14a-11 did not remedy any existing obstacles.334 Second, federal 
regulation, not state law, has historically been the dominant obstacle to private 
ordering. The SEC rules, not state law, prevent the use of a universal ballot that 
would afford shareholders the freedom to choose from a complete list of issuer 
and shareholder candidates.335 The SEC rules, not state law, burden 
shareholder attempts to engage in collective action in connection with the 
election process by regulating such attempts as proxy solicitations. And the 
SEC rules impose compliance costs, including filing requirements, on 
shareholders seeking to exercise their state law nominating power. 
Third, and most importantly, while state law cannot provide shareholders 
with the ability to overcome existing federal regulatory obstacles, it can 
nonetheless undercut the minimum level of nominating power afforded by a 
 
 333 Some commentators argued that a mandatory federal proxy access rule was necessary because of the 
limitations on shareholder ability to establish proxy access procedures through private ordering. See, e.g., 
Letter from Julie Gresham, Corporate Sec’y, Shareowner Educ. Network, and Ann Yerger, Exec. Dir., Council 
of Inst. Investors, to Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-10-09/s71009-568.pdf. 
 334 The extent of those obstacles may also be overstated. For example, the SEC identified various 
limitations on shareholder power to amend the bylaws to establish proxy access procedures. Adopting Release, 
supra note 12, at 56,673. However, only about 4% of Russell 3000 companies do not permit shareholders to 
amend the bylaws. Beth Young, The Limits of Private Ordering: Restrictions on Shareholders’ Ability to 
Initiate Governance Change and Distortions of the Shareholder Voting Process, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 6 (2009), http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/The%20Limits%20of%20Private%20Ordering%20 
UPDATED%2011-17-09.pdf. In addition, market developments suggest that institutional investors are making 
substantial progress in increasing shareholder voting power, despite the SEC’s resistance to their efforts. See 
Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 872–76 (2010). 
 335 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (2011) (prohibiting the inclusion of director candidates on proxy cards 
without their consent); accord Zachery Kouwe, Ackman and Target Tangle in Ballot Brawl, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Apr. 21, 2009, 7:48 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/04/21/ackman-and-target-tangle-in-
ballot-brawl/ (“Currently, shareholders in most contested corporate elections, including Target’s, receive two 
proxy cards and can vote only for one slate of candidates.”). 
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federal rule. Thus, to the extent that Rule 14a-11 was an effort to respond to 
limitations in state law or private ordering, it was inadequate. 
Rule 14a-11 explicitly provided that it was subject to the availability of 
shareholder nominating rights under state law.336 Accordingly, state 
legislatures could have completely nullified the effect of the rule by 
eliminating shareholder nominating power—such as by vesting such power in 
the board or a board nominating committee. Similarly, after the rule’s 
adoption, commentators immediately suggested that issuers consider 
implementing director qualification bylaws.337 Although Rule 14a-11 did not 
permit an issuer to exclude a shareholder nominee from the ballot on the basis 
that the nominee did not meet the company’s qualification requirements,338 
nothing in the SEC rules required a company to seat a director that did not 
meet its qualification requirements.339 Similarly, issuers could have thwarted 
shareholder efforts at group formation by adopting low-threshold poison 
pills.340 One academic outlined fifteen possible ways of limiting shareholder 
nominating power,341 and it seems difficult to imagine the SEC precluding 
these responses without taking on a much more substantive role in regulating 
corporate governance—a role extending well beyond the authorization in 
Dodd–Frank. 
Finally, state regulation of corporate governance offers extensive 
safeguards against excessive or inefficient shareholder activism. Individual 
issuers can limit proxy access, in the same manner that Rule 14a-11 did, by 
 
 336 Adopting Release, supra note 12, at 56,674 (“The rule defers entirely to State law as to whether 
shareholders have the right to nominate directors and what voting rights shareholders have in the election of 
directors.”). 
 337 See, e.g., Adam O. Emmerich, Shareholder Proxy Access: Time to Get Ready, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 16, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/09/ 
16/shareholder-proxy-access-time-to-get-ready/ (suggesting that companies review their director qualification 
bylaws and stating that “companies may, subject to state law, preclude nominees from serving as directors for 
failure to satisfy reasonable qualification requirements”). 
 338 See id. 
 339 Indeed, there is case authority suggesting that the election of a director who did not, at the time of his 
election, meet the company’s qualification requirements would be invalid. See Keith Paul Bishop, Director 
Qualification Requirements, Nominations & Proxy Access, CAL. CORP. & SEC. L. (Sept. 7, 2010), http:// 
calcorporatelaw.com/2010/09/director-qualification-requirements-nominations-proxy-access/ (citing and 
discussing Waterbury v. Temescal Water Co., 105 P. 940 (Cal. Ct. App. 1909)). 
 340 See, e.g., Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010) (upholding the validity of a pill 
with a 4.99% trigger). 
 341 J.W. Verret, Defending Against Shareholder Proxy Access: Delaware’s Future Reviewing Company 
Defenses in the Era of Dodd–Frank, 36 J. CORP. L. 391, 404–15 (2011). 
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imposing minimum ownership and holding period requirements.342 To the 
extent that such bylaws unduly restrict shareholder nominating power, state 
courts and legislatures have a variety of responses available, ranging from the 
use of judicially imposed limits on the extent to which these bylaws can limit 
shareholder voting rights343 to legislative requirements that such limitations be 
included in the corporate charter (and thus approved by shareholders) rather 
than being implemented through a director-adopted bylaw.344 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY APPROACH 
This Article has questioned the SEC’s motives in adopting a federal proxy 
access rule and challenged the SEC’s competence to establish appropriate 
criteria for modifying the balance of power between shareholders and 
management in determining the composition of the board of directors. 
Although existing political forces are likely to preclude the SEC from 
responding to the D.C. Circuit decision in the short term, the invalidation of 
Rule 14a-11 should cause the SEC to reconsider its overall approach to 
shareholder participation in the nomination of directors. 
The solution to the deficiencies described in this Article, along with the 
concerns identified by the D.C. Circuit, is not to return to the pre-Rule 14a-11 
status quo. As the SEC itself recognized, both the promulgation and 
interpretation of the federal proxy rules directly interfere with the exercise of 
shareholder power and shareholder attempts to reallocate the balance of 
authority at individual issuers with respect to both the composition of the board 
of directors and other governance issues. Rather than attempting to determine 
an appropriate balance of power, the SEC should simply stop trying to regulate 
corporate governance. Instead, the SEC should revise the federal proxy rules to 
remove the impediments that currently limit the ability of states, issuers, and 
shareholders to experiment with, vary, and improve governance structures. 
 
 342 Cf. JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 340–46 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(upholding the validity of an advance notice bylaw but reading it narrowly); ROBERT R. CARLSON & JEFFREY 
T. HARTLIN, PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER LLP, REVISITING ADVANCE NOTICE BYLAWS IN LIGHT 
OF RECENT DELAWARE DECISIONS 1 (2008), available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/981. 
pdf (advising clients on how to revise advance notice bylaws to reflect concerns raised by recent Delaware 
decisions). 
 343 See JANA Master Fund, Ltd., 954 A.2d at 338 (determining whether CNET’s advance notice bylaw, if 
construed broadly, should be held invalid as “an unreasonable restriction on [the] shareholder franchise”). 
 344 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (Supp. 2008) (permitting issuers to establish classified boards 
through charter provision but not through director-adopted bylaw). 
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Removing these impediments is easy. Instead of trying to structure proxy 
access, the SEC should allow state law to determine both the circumstances 
under which shareholders have the power to nominate director candidates and 
the appropriate qualifications for nominating shareholders and their nominees. 
State law can make these determinations in a variety of ways. State statutes can 
set forth the scope of shareholder nominating power. Similarly, state statutes 
can, as Delaware already does, explicitly authorize issuers to adopt 
individually tailored nominating procedures and to describe the manner for 
doing so. Under the traditional enabling approach of state law, issuers can 
establish individually tailored nominating procedures directly, through charter 
and bylaw provisions, and indirectly, by specifying director qualification 
requirements, advance notice rules, annual meeting procedures, and so forth. 
Overreaching by either shareholders or corporate management can be 
constrained through judicial review—state courts can evaluate the permissible 
scope of issuer-specific provisions and restrictions consistent with 
shareholders’ statutory voting authority and management’s fiduciary 
obligations. Federal proxy rules should, instead, focus on the SEC’s core 
competency—disclosure. 
Accordingly, this Article advocates the following regulatory changes. First, 
the SEC should amend Regulation 14A to require issuers to disclose in their 
proxy statements all properly nominated director candidates, whether the 
nominations are made by a nominating committee, a shareholder, or some 
other mechanism.345 State law, including case law, state corporation statutes, 
and the issuer’s governing documents (to the extent those documents are 
consistent with state law), would determine whether a nomination is proper. 
This amendment would enable individual issuers to experiment with varying 
criteria, such as the ownership threshold or holding period, to determine the 
extent to which their choices affected the quality and quantity of shareholder 
nominations. It would also allow issuers to experiment with other mechanisms 
for increasing shareholder input, such as expense reimbursement or 
shareholder representation on nominating committees. Issuers would also have 
the power to adopt mechanisms to limit the extent of shareholder input, 
 
 345 In 2002, Les Greenberg and James McRitchie filed a rule-making petition with the SEC proposing an 
amendment to Rule 14a-8 that, although structured somewhat differently from the proposal in this Article, 
would have had the similar effect of providing “that the solicitation of proxies for all nominees for Director 
positions, who meet the other legal requirements, be required to be included in the Company’s proxy 
materials.” Request for Rulemaking to Amend Rule 14a-8(i) to Allow Shareholder Proposals to Elect 
Directors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4-461.htm. 
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including imposing qualification requirements and establishing methods for 
determining priority among director candidates. 
In terms of disclosure, federal law would require that the issuer provide 
comparable disclosure in the proxy statement for all director candidates, 
including the directors’ employment, compensation, other directorships, and 
qualifications. Nominating shareholders and their nominees would be required 
to supply this information to the issuer as a condition of inclusion in the proxy 
statement. Issuers would also be required to disclose, in the proxy statement 
and for each director candidate, the source of that director’s nomination (e.g., 
issuer nominating committee or shareholder). If the issuer’s proxy statement 
includes a statement in support of any of the board-nominated director 
candidates, Regulation 14A would require the board to give nominating 
shareholders the opportunity to include a supporting statement of equal length 
for their nominees. 
Second, consistent with the disclosure in the proxy statement, the SEC 
should amend Rule 14a-4 to require the issuer’s proxy card to give 
shareholders the opportunity to vote for any of the candidates included in the 
proxy statement. The proxy card would thus constitute a universal ballot for all 
properly nominated candidates. 
Third, the SEC should adopt exemptions from sections 13(d) and 16(b) for 
collective shareholder action in connection with the election of directors so 
long as the shareholders do not, individually or collectively, seek to obtain 
economic control of the issuer. Specifically, the exemption should provide that 
collective shareholder action does not, itself, create a group for purposes of 
13(d) or result in the aggregation of shareholder holdings for purposes of 13(d) 
or 16(b). Such exemptions should extend to both the nomination and the 
election of directors and the collective action associated with proposed bylaw 
amendments concerning director qualifications, nominating procedures, and 
similar issues. 
Finally, the federal proxy rules should directly facilitate issuer efforts to 
experiment with different mechanisms for private ordering. In particular, the 
SEC should extend the disinterested shareholder exemption under Rule 14A-
2(b)(1) to exempt shareholders engaging in collective action for the purpose of 
nominating director candidates pursuant to their issuer’s nominating 
procedures from the notice and filing requirements of the federal proxy rules. 
This change would remove the important existing impediment to nominating 
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procedures that require a minimum number of shareholders to support or 
second a nomination. 
A major advantage of this proposal is that it enables shareholders and 
issuers to experiment with a broader range of options for increasing 
shareholder input into board composition. Rule 14a-11 was, after all, roughly 
modeled on a proxy access procedure developed by shareholders.346 Absent 
regulatory interference, issuers could develop a variety of alternative 
procedures. Issuers could use the existing nominating committee to nominate 
two candidates for each board position. This approach meets some of the 
current objections to proxy access by enabling the nominating committee to 
maintain control over director selection, control that addresses concerns over 
director qualifications, conflicts of interest, and overall board composition, 
while increasing the degree of shareholder choice. Another approach could 
authorize corporations to increase board size to accommodate shareholder-
nominated candidates without displacing existing issuer nominees. This 
approach would increase shareholder input without creating an active contest 
that might displace sitting directors. 
In experimenting with proxy access procedures, investors and issuers might 
also look to the experiences of other common law countries.347 Australia and 
Canada, for example, allow nominations by 5% shareholders without the 
requirement of a minimum holding period.348 Australia also authorizes 
nominations by groups of one hundred shareholders.349 Although caution is 
necessary in importing the governance approaches of countries with different 
corporate structures and ownership models, the experiences of these countries 
cast doubt on the objections posed by critics of proxy access. Shareholder 
candidates are rarely nominated and still less frequently elected. Rather than 
inciting frequent contested elections, the Australian system, for example, is 
 
 346 See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing the AFSCME decision and the SEC’s 
response). 
 347 Examining proxy access from a global perspective suggests the availability of alternative governance 
rights that might substitute for increased nominating power as well. Shareholders in some common law 
countries have the right to amend the corporation’s charter and the right to call an extraordinary shareholders 
meeting at which they can take actions such as removing directors with whom they are dissatisfied. See 
Jennifer Hill, Evolving ‘Rules of the Game’ in Corporate Governance Reform, 1 INT’L J. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
28 (2008). 
 348 Letter from Michael O’Sullivan, President, Austl. Council of Super Investors, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC 1 (Aug. 14, 2009) [hereinafter O’Sullivan Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
10-09/s71009-195.pdf; Robert McDermott & Sean Farrell, Canada, GLOBAL CORP. GOVERNANCE GUIDE 
2004, http://www.globalcorporategovernance.com/n_namericas/134_140.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2012). 
 349 O’Sullivan Letter, supra note 348, at 1. 
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said to promote the peaceful transition of directors in whom investors have lost 
confidence.350 
An alternative approach would provide minority shareholder groups of 
sufficient size with the right not merely to nominate director candidates but to 
secure board representation. Under the voting list approach taken by Italy and 
Spain, for example, minority shareholders can propose a list of shareholder 
nominees that competes with the official list of candidates and ensure that at 
least one of their representatives obtains a director seat.351 One commentator 
reports that the system, which has been in effect in Italy since 2006, has 
worked “smoothly” and has affected the board composition of listed 
companies.352 
Another option is shareholder participation on the issuer’s nominating 
committee. In Sweden, the nominating committee consists of shareholders 
rather than directors.353 The Swedish shareholder nominating committee 
approach has recently been publicized by the Centre for Tomorrow’s 
Company, a think tank that had urged United Kingdom corporations to adopt a 
similar structure for selecting directors.354 A variation on this approach might 
be a nominating committee jointly comprised of shareholders and independent 
directors. 
It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate the relative 
costs and benefits of these and other alternatives. The point is that the 
corporate structure contains a variety of methods and mechanisms for 
increasing shareholder input into the selection of directors. In the absence of 
empirical or normative justification for the SEC’s chosen approach, it is 
imprudent to prevent states and issuers from considering these alternatives. 
 
 350 Id. 
 351 Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in Directors’ Elections: A Revolution in the Making 
35–36 (European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper No. 147/2010, 2010), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1558467. See generally Matteo Erede et al., Italy’s ‘Vote by Slate’—An Innovative Method 
to Elect Minority Directors, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NETWORK 2009 YEARBOOK 54 
(Kevin Eddy ed., 2009), available at http://www.icgn.org/files/icgn_main/pdfs/year_books/icgn_yearbook_ 
2009.pdf (describing list voting in Italy); Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated Ownership 
Structure: Can Hedge Funds Activism Play Any Role in Italy? 20–24 (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397562 (describing Italian law provisions protecting rights of minority 
shareholders). 
 352 Ventoruzzo, supra note 351, at 36. 
 353 See TOMORROW’S CO., TOMORROW’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: BRIDGING THE UK ENGAGEMENT 
GAP THROUGH SWEDISH-STYLE NOMINATION COMMITTEES 3 (2010) (describing the Swedish system), 
available at http://www.forceforgood.com/Uploaded_Content/tool/243201011485875.pdf. 
 354 Id. at 9, 42–43, 45, 47. 
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The amendments proposed by this Article might not result in effective 
shareholder nominating rights. Issuers might respond by adopting bylaw 
provisions that impose procedural requirements, director qualifications, filing 
deadlines, or conditions for nominating shareholders that are impossible to 
meet. Indeed, private ordering may lead to more limited nominating rights than 
those the SEC attempted to provide through Rule 14a-11. Critically, however, 
regulating shareholder nominating rights as a component of corporate 
governance offers a variety of fail-safes and counterbalances that limit 
potential managerial overreaching in the way that a restrictive federal rule does 
not. As we have seen in recent years, private ordering and state regulation have 
enabled corporate governance mechanisms to adapt to firm and market 
developments. Innovations, such as majority voting and firm-specific 
modifications like the elimination of staggered boards, shift the balance of 
power between shareholders and management. In the current environment, the 
pump is primed for reform of nominating procedures. The SEC just has to get 
out of the way. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no need for the SEC to try to determine the optimal level of 
shareholder nominating power. The area would have been free for state law 
and issuer-specific experimentation if the SEC had simply held seventy years 
ago that issuers were required to disclose the existence of all properly 
nominated director candidates on the issuer’s proxy statement and to provide 
shareholders with a chance to vote on the election of such candidates. Instead, 
the SEC viewed its responsibility with respect to proxy access too broadly. The 
SEC’s expertise with respect to market regulation, disclosure, and investor 
protection does not translate into expertise over corporate governance. Nothing 
in the SEC’s structure, composition, or experience indicates that it is better 
positioned than state legislatures, state courts, and corporations themselves to 
determine who should sit on corporate boards or to allocate power between 
shareholders and managers to decide this question.355 
 
 355 See Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting to Propose Amendments Regarding 
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2009/spch052009tap.htm (“The Commission is not well-positioned to decide ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out.’”). 
Whether Congress can or should make those determinations is a separate matter. Since the adoption of 
Sarbanes–Oxley, Congress has made increasing, albeit cautious, inroads into the type of policy determinations 
over corporate law and governance that previously had been left exclusively to state law and, to an extent, 
private ordering. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 
2003, at 26, 26, 28 (describing the increasing federal control of corporate law). Dodd–Frank provides 
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The SEC’s adoption of a proxy access rule in 2010 was misguided. Market 
and legal developments had reduced the need for a mandated form of proxy 
access, and the SEC’s rule was so narrow and restrictive that it was unlikely to 
enhance shareholder nominating power. At the same time, the SEC’s attempt 
to funnel shareholder nominating efforts through the federal procedure would 
likely have frustrated experimentation with more effective alternatives. In 
adopting Rule 14a-11, the SEC acted as corporate governance czar—
displacing existing state law governance mechanisms in order to decide how 
much governance power shareholders should enjoy. 
In responding to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the SEC should reconsider a 
regulatory approach that continues to impede shareholder efforts to impose 
accountability on corporate boards. Specifically, the SEC should modify its 
proxy rules to facilitate shareholder choice about nomination procedures. This 
Article has identified minor amendments to the federal proxy rules that would 
reduce federal interference with private ordering. Although issuer-specific 
experimentation may not produce the perfect proxy access procedure, it—
unlike the SEC’s regulatory process—is likely to produce experiential data 
that, at a minimum, can facilitate more informed governance choices. In the 
absence of federal interference, issuers, state legislatures and courts, and 
investors themselves can respond to that experience. 
 
 
fragments of the most aggressive federalization of corporate law to date with its inclusion of provisions 
concerning shareholder approval of executive compensation, the composition of compensation committees, the 
separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board, and the promulgation of self-regulatory 
organization standards specifying director duties. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 763(a), 951, 972, 124 Stat. 
1778, 1899, 1915 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 78n (Supp. IV 2010)). To date, however, 
the federalization remains largely a piecemeal effort. With the limited exception of Say on Pay, see supra note 
270, which is, in any case, a nonbinding advisory vote, Dodd–Frank does not modify the substantive issues 
upon which shareholders can vote or the procedures by which they exercise that voting power. 
